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INTRODUCTION

C

LASS actions are no longer functional. In 1966, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules embarked on a guarded experiment by
anticipating how class actions might help enforce substantive laws. But
in the years since, both Congress and the courts have twisted and curtailed that experiment through increasingly strict certification standards.
Now plaintiffs’ attorneys forgo a bevy of claims to buttress their certification argument, bootstrap state law claims into federal causes of action,
or bill class-certification questions at such high levels of generality that
judges are confronted with an all-or-nothing proposition: to certify, or
not. But these strict standards and corresponding tactics have evolved
from a misguided focus on class members’ cohesiveness vis-à-vis one
another and a failure by parties and courts alike to frame and adjudicate
collectively what actually unites plaintiffs—a defendant’s conduct.
This black-or-white thinking is not without consequence. Without
certification, some litigation—like small-stakes consumer claims—will
evaporate, which undermines enforcement goals. While economically
viable claims will not wholly disappear, most injured people will not
sue, which raises questions about realizing compensation and deterrence
aims. And plaintiffs’ attorneys’ strategy of presenting only potentially
certifiable causes of action can simultaneously risk disabling viable personal-injury claims and saddling subsequent proceedings with unpredictable preclusion. Plaintiffs who do sue individually are likely to be
corralled into multidistrict litigation, where judges face similar agency
problems but lack clear policing authority absent class certification. 1
Certifying fewer classes also seemingly correlates with increased
public regulation through state attorneys’ parens patriae power. While
faithful attorneys general can fill a much maligned regulatory void, 2 as
the New York Times recently reported, they can also be purchased with
timely campaign contributions. 3 Moreover, when state attorneys proceed
exclusively in state court, parens patriae actions incite further concerns
about inconsistent outcomes, precluding private claims, and inadequately representing constituents.
1
Without certifying a class, multidistrict litigation judges lack clear authority to award attorneys’ fees, ensure adequate representation, or approve settlements. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 117–18 (2015).
2
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 661–68 (2012).
3
Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
2014, at A1.
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Issue classes, where courts certify only certain claims or elements
within those claims, can shed conventional black-or-white thinking
about certification, equip private regulators with a procedural means to
stymie these concerns, and advance substantive values. But issue classes
palliate these pitfalls only insofar as judges abandon their misguided
search for internal class unity and recognize that the defendant’s conduct, when uniform, is what bonds plaintiffs—not race, gender, identical
injuries, or consistent damages.
Reorienting traditional philosophies about class cohesion frees judges
to think pragmatically about how to situate, sort, and adjudicate the
components of claims and defenses by classifying them into their constituent parts. Most legal elements can be cataloged according to whether they address a defendant’s alleged conduct or a plaintiff’s eligibility
for relief. When a defendant’s conduct is nonindividuated toward plaintiffs or when substantive law permits plaintiffs to satisfy their eligibility
for relief with aggregate proof, those components are ripe for aggregate
treatment. Adjudicating those issues collectively may substantially advance all the claims, increase efficiency by reducing replicated proof,
and minimize inconsistent verdicts.
The promise of issue classes has not gone unnoticed. 4 After a rocky debut in the 1990s with appellate decisions in Castano v. American Tobacco
Co. 5 and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 6 issue classes are now experiencing a renaissance: They top the Rule 23 subcommittee’s agenda for
potential rule changes and have been embraced by most circuit courts. 7

4
For example, the Bureau of National Affairs recently ran a “Special Report” featuring
this author’s views. Perry Cooper, Issue Classes Swell in Consumer Suits: Are Potential Rewards Worth the Risk?, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 68 (Feb. 13, 2015).
5
84 F.3d 734, 747–49 (5th Cir. 1996).
6
51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995).
7
Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. et al., “Weigh in Early.” A Town Hall Meeting with the Rule 23
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Oct. 23, 2014), http://shop.american
bar.org/PersonifyImages/ProductFiles/211246/CEN4CAC_WebBrochure2.pdf. Thus far, the subcommittee’s recognition of the emerging consensus and proposal for allowing appellate review
largely follow this Article’s recommendations, and I am grateful to several subcommittee members for taking the time to talk with me and for soliciting diverse views from wide-ranging audiences on multiple occasions. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Agenda Book
281–83 (2015), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%
20Books/Civil/CV2015-04.pdf. Even circuits with initial reluctance have revisited the issue. E.g.,
In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 804 (5th Cir. 2014); see also infra Subsection III.A.1 (discussing
circuit court opinions).
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To date, however, scholars have done little beyond debating whether issue classes should exist. 8
This Article changes the status quo with two principal contributions.
First, after identifying how our existing procedural landscape fails to effectively redress nationwide misconduct, it constructs a unifying doctrinal theory as to when collectively resolving a single issue will be
worthwhile. By reconsidering disjointed notions of class cohesion and
recasting claims and defenses into defendant’s conduct or plaintiff’s eligibility components, it demystifies the certification calculus and sets the
stage for courts to certify classes that resolve key issues like a defendant’s uniform conduct. This resists the all-or-nothing approach to certification and coordinates the judicial response to jurisdictionally disaggregated regulators. Second, it offers solutions to a medley of sticky legal
and logistical quandaries such as how to compensate issue-class counsel
when no common fund exists, ensure appropriate error-correction mechanisms through interlocutory appeals, coordinate fragmented public and
private regulators, remand multidistrict litigation cases post-issueclasses, and confront Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns.
Part I begins by identifying and defining the central problem of today’s regulatory terrain: When a national corporation behaves egregiously, that single act or series of acts gets distorted through several legal prisms—jurisdictional restrictions, state law intricacies, and limited
regulatory authority. Unless there is parity between the regulator’s authority, the governing law, the court’s jurisdiction, and the corporation’s
nationwide conduct, the net effect is to thwart coordinated enforcement.
Defendants successfully capitalize on these imbalances to avoid class
certification, at least until they want the umbrella of closure that settlement classes provide. But this prompts settlement-oriented litigation.
8

Compare Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 718, 721,
723–24 (2014) (arguing, in part, that rule changes must occur before courts can implement
issue classes), and Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal,
62 DePaul L. Rev. 733, 735–40 (2013) (arguing against using issue classes), with Patricia
Bronte et al., “Carving at the Joint”: The Precise Function of Rule 23(c)(4), 62 DePaul L.
Rev. 745, 746–47 (2013) (positing that circuits splits on issue classes are resolving in favor
of their use), Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 Utah L. Rev. 249, 285–90 (suggesting that Rule 23’s predominance analysis should accommodate issue certification), and Jenna C. Smith, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class
Actions, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1206–14 (2013) (analyzing cases to advocate using issue
classes for consumer claims).
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Plaintiffs’ attorneys sacrifice valuable claims to satisfy strict certification standards, have little bargaining leverage with defendants, and rarely test the claims’ merits. This risks undervaluing claims, undermining
deterrence, and encouraging splintered enforcement, which escalates inadequate-representation concerns and prompts erratic preclusion decisions.
Class certification, adequate representation, and preclusion all boil
down to whether a class is cohesive—a term that appears nowhere in
Rule 23, but has emerged at the heart of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part II irons out doctrinal difficulties with class cohesion and situates defendant’s conduct as what unifies plaintiffs. When misconduct toward
plaintiffs is uniform, adjudicating conduct components collectively promotes consistency. But this also reveals a fundamental flaw when plaintiffs’ attorneys try to transform decentralized conduct toward different
individuals into a group wrong by deploying “aggregate proof” through
statistical or economic experts. Without a change in substantive law, the
magic of mathematical models is just smoke and mirrors—models cannot make disparate conduct uniform.
Part III recognizes that, as usual, the devil is in the details. It thus
breaks new ground by carefully parsing interrelated doctrinal, political,
logistical, and constitutional concerns about issue classes. While issue
classes can promote resource parity between parties and reduce inconsistent decisions as to the same conduct, certifying inconsequential issues can generate undue settlement pressure. Yet, certifying only components that resolve core questions and instituting appeals on the merits
can alleviate this pressure. Conversely, without appropriate incentives,
issue classes could lie stillborn in the hands of plaintiffs’ attorneys: Because issue classes do not produce a final judgment, there may be no
common fund from which to collect fees. Adapting charging liens and
the common-benefit doctrine, however, ensures compensation for class
counsel if plaintiffs subsequently benefit from the issue class’s preclusive effect.
To be sure, issue classes can do only so much. Multiple regulators
persist and procedural mechanisms cannot alter regulatory and jurisdictional overlap. But, because issue classes work by precluding relitigation in follow-on proceedings, they can facilitate cross-pollination
between (and consistency among) public and private enforcers in dispersed fora. Likewise, they offer a means for transferee judges to resolve
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common conduct questions in multidistrict litigation when plenary classes are nonviable.
I. REFRACTING UNIFORM MISCONDUCT
Most businesses outgrew jurisdictional limits long ago. Nationwide
conduct and conflicting state laws thus make it increasingly challenging
for nonfederal entities like state attorneys general and private citizens to
hold companies accountable for the full scope of any wrongdoing. When
something goes awry with a product marketed nationwide, a mismatch
occurs unless the regulator’s authority, the applicable substantive law,
and the court’s jurisdiction all mirror the impact of defendant’s misconduct. When they do align, a regulator with full resources can address
wrongs appropriately. But parity between the regulator and the regulated
is rare. Thus, suits concerning the same alleged wrongdoing are scattered in state and federal courts throughout the country, making effective, predictable enforcement challenging. Accordingly, this Part begins
by labeling and defining this prism effect, and then explores its impact
on regulatory coordination, efficient resource use, substantive enforcement of rights, and consistent outcomes.
A. The Prism Effect: Distorting Defendant’s Conduct
To illustrate the prism effect, consider a simple example: An engineer
testing car safety finds a defect that can cause the vehicle to suddenly
accelerate without the driver’s prompting. Important decisions follow
such as whether the engineer properly reports the incident; how far up
the chain of command that report goes; whether the engineering department communicates with the legal department; and whether the company issues an immediate recall or blames driver error. 9 While the company’s size and the number of affected people complicate these elementary
questions, judges and juries routinely resolve issues like these every day.
But the bigger the company and the larger its geographic reach, the more
likely it is that these relatively straightforward conduct questions are ad9

In the Toyota acceleration litigation, Toyota initially blamed floor mats and trapped gas
pedals for the problem when the root cause was a sticky gas pedal caused by plastic material
inside the pedal. Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Settlement to End Probe of Accelerator Problems, Wash. Post (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12-billion-settlement-toend-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html.
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judicated ineffectively. As prisms distort light, the limits of a regulator’s
authority, the boundaries of a court’s jurisdictional reach, and the divergences among state laws refract defendant’s uniform conduct, adding to
the regulatory complexity.
Without parity between a regulator’s power and the defendant’s nationwide conduct, enforcement can be fragmented and disjointed. For
example, in the Toyota sudden-acceleration cases, multiple private attorneys filed class-action complaints before the recall, 10 twenty-nine
states’ attorneys general sued after the recall, 11 and the U.S. Department
of Justice fined the company $1.2 billion. 12 But each entity’s regulatory
scope differed dramatically: The Department of Justice’s reach mirrored
Toyota’s nationwide sales as might a nationwide class action, but
statewide classes and state attorneys general could govern Toyota’s conduct only insofar as it impacted a particular state.
Most public and private litigants are constrained by a court’s jurisdiction and their own regulatory authority. 13 In parens patriae actions, a
state attorney general can sue only on behalf of her state and its citizens.
State attorneys’ status as public actors who involve only a single state’s
law allows them to circumvent some of the procedural uncertainties that
Rule 23 presents. 14 But, unless all state attorneys enter the fray—and only twenty-nine did so in the Toyota sudden-acceleration cases 15—they
cannot fully redress defendant’s past conduct even though they might
negotiate for broad injunctive relief that affects future conduct uniformly.
Likewise, in individual suits, most people prefer not to sue and those
who do may find that their claim is not worth an attorney’s investment. 16
Joinder and multidistrict litigation recalibrate the cost imbalance in part
10

Nancy J. Moore et al., Class Actions Against Toyota Mount as Nationwide, State Suits
Are Filed, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 147 (Feb. 26, 2010).
11
Chris Woodyard, Toyota Recall Nightmare Results in Deal with 29 States, USA Today (Feb.
14, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/02/14/toyota-recalls-attorney-generalsettlement/1919883/.
12
Douglas & Fletcher, supra note 9.
13
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the
U.S. Experience, 34 Tex. Int’l L.J. 135, 137 (1999) (discussing limited jurisdiction).
14
But some courts have required individual proof, subjecting them to a shadow Rule 23
standard. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
15
Woodyard, supra note 11.
16
See Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 Calif. L.
Rev. 1697, 1702 (2005) (using mathematical models and sociological research to support the
notion that most injured persons do not sue).
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by pooling claims and placing the onus of funding and developing
common discovery on the plaintiffs’ steering committee. But when individual claims arise from disparate states’ laws and the transferee judge
has authority over pretrial procedures only, feasibility problems persist.
The only way to resolve cases collectively is to settle—not adjudicate.
Multidistrict litigation thus suffers from an additional mismatch between
transferee judges’ limited decisional authority and the scope of behavior
they attempt to regulate.
The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) exacerbated the prism effect by making putative classes removable, even where state law provides the decisional rules. When multiple states’ laws apply to a nationwide class, transferee judges are at a loss: Certifying a class action
seems unmanageable, they are not the foremost authority on other states’
laws, 17 and yet they face tremendous pressure to resolve the litigation. 18
Absent remanding cases to their transferor courts, which transferee
judges loathe doing, their jurisdictional limits constrain private attorneys’ ability to credibly threaten a trial and make multidistrict litigation
an ill-suited means to regulate nationwide misconduct.
As multidistrict litigation illustrates, substantive law and remedial relief can further refract the defendant’s uniform behavior. When nationwide classes arise out of state law, the class’s scope may mirror the defendant’s conduct, but the choice-of-law problem injects a wrinkle that
can render classes unmanageable and thus uncertifiable in federal court.
To be sure, the problem is not with states adopting their own laws,
which is a central feature of federalism, but in assuming laws’ differences without examining whether each defines core elements of a defendant’s wrongdoing in similar terms. Put simply, when many states’
laws govern, there is no single body of law that is coterminous with defendant’s conduct, but there may be similarities among those laws that

17
In re Activated Carbon-Based Clothing Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d
1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“‘[T]he transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the
state law of their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess’ these claims.”
(quoting In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me.
2011))).
18
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 La. L. Rev. 399, 417
(2014) (“[T]he Panel views quickly settling a complex case as a hallmark of success that favorably disposes it to reward that judge with a new assignment.”); see also Susan Willett Bird,
Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 475, 482
n.42 (1975) (reporting that related cases were “assigned specifically to Judge X . . . because he
was ‘especially able’”).
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would allow courts to adjudicate conduct uniformly. Yet, unlike declaratory or injunctive relief that targets defendant’s actions, determining
which plaintiffs are entitled to damages can shift the focus away from
the defendant’s behavior and toward individual eligibility requirements,
often dooming Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance analysis. 19 So, even
though a nationwide class action’s regulatory scope theoretically mirrors
the defendant’s wrongdoing, class actions may fall prey to the prism effect, too, unless they invoke federal law in federal court.
B. Exploiting the Mismatch to Fragment Class Actions
As repeat players, defendants are all too aware of a class action’s enforcement power. 20 To undermine class certification, they have steadily
amassed a series of victories that exploit imbalances between power and
jurisdiction 21 and shift attention away from uniform wrongdoing—even
wrongdoing that receives consistent treatment under federal law—and
toward diverse plaintiffs. 22 For example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
strengthened the commonality standard under Rule 23(a) and ensured
that defendants could raise individual defenses, which may inject disparate issues into an otherwise cohesive class. 23 What matters now is not
whether plaintiffs can raise common questions, but whether “a classwide
proceeding [can] generate common answers apt to drive the resolution
of the litigation.” 24 After Dukes, defendants have convinced courts to
scrutinize the plaintiffs’ commonality vis-à-vis one another and have
19
See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)).
20
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 100 (1974) (“[Repeat players] can play for rules as
well as immediate gains. First, it pays a[ repeat player]to expend resources in influencing the
making of the relevant rules by such methods as lobbying.”).
21
E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 4–5.
22
E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Now plaintiffs must prove
Rule 23’s standards by a preponderance of the evidence and district courts must consider the
merits before certifying a class—at least insofar as the merits overlap with Rule 23’s requirements. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014);
Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
23
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–54, 2561.
24
Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate
Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).
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thereby dodged class certification in toxic-tort cases, 25 environmentallaw cases, 26 products-liability cases, 27 breach-of-contract claims, 28 and
Truth in Lending Act claims to name but a few. 29
This logic, that variances among plaintiffs can undermine certification, gained further footing in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. 30 Comcast extended Dukes’s “rigorous analysis” standard from Rule 23(b)(2) classes
to Rule 23(b)(3) classes and held that plaintiffs’ antitrust damages had to
be calculable on a class-wide basis. 31 Otherwise, divisible remedies
might overwhelm predominance, rendering the class uncertifiable. 32 As
the dissenters pointed out, before Comcast, courts routinely certified antitrust classes with individual-damage calculations; adjudicating questions about defendants’ antitrust-related conduct uniformly saved substantial time and expense. 33
Given their luck overcoming class actions in federal courts, defendants hoped to expand CAFA’s removal jurisdiction to state parens patriae actions. When filed in federal courts and consolidated with private
claims, some federal judges subjected parens patriae litigation to shadow Rule 23 standards and emphasized citizens’ individual proof. 34 That
25

Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 03-47775-NZ, slip op. at 2–5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 18,
2011) (pinion and order denying class certification), available at 2011 WL 3269118.
26
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 260–62 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding the district
court’s refusal to certify CERCLA claims based on contaminated drinking water because
plaintiffs could not establish commonality).
27
See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (“BPA”) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276
F.R.D. 336, 344 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (refusing to certify a class because individualized damage
inquiries and plaintiffs’ differing knowledge about the BPA controversy undermined commonality).
28
Altier v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, No. 11-241, 2011 WL 3205229, at *13
(E.D. La. July 26, 2011) (declining to certify claims adjusters’ breach-of-employment
agreement claims in part because the allegations would require individualized damage determinations).
29
Haynes v. Planet Automall, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 65, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that questions concerning whether fees and warranties were part of TILA’s finance charge could not
“be answered uniformly on a class-wide basis”).
30
133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Recognition that individual damages calculations
do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”).
34
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reasoning that state claims stand “on the foundation of many thousands of conceptually separate
claims”). Judge Fallon’s reasoning in the Vioxx litigation likewise required individualized
proof, noting that the prescribing decision in each doctor-patient relationship differed and
that a state would have to prove that each doctor would not have prescribed the drug but for
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prompted defendants to claim that state suits were simply class actions
in disguise and therefore removable under CAFA. But the Supreme
Court’s recent ruling in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.
clarified that CAFA’s text, which requires class allegations or one hundred or more plaintiffs suing jointly, 35 does not cover parens patriae
claims involving only a single plaintiff: the state. 36 While this decision
constitutes a limited victory for states’ attorneys, it can also hinder formal coordination among regulators.
As class actions fragment, so too does enforcement. When regulators
have overlapping authority and their power is not coterminous with the
impact of a defendant’s behavior, multiple regulators will sue in different fora to police the same misconduct. Coordination is ad hoc, at best.
Despite some efforts by states’ attorneys to create multistate groups, 37
partner with federal agencies, 38 or hire private plaintiffs’ attorneys to assist them with parens patriae cases, 39 a single question persists: Are
these efforts enough to overcome the prism effect and fill enforcement
gaps?
Even though newsworthy events can entice attorneys general to sue,
for better or worse, private attorneys remain the principal means for enforcing run-of-the-mill substantive rights in areas like employment discrimination, securities fraud, products liability, consumer fraud, antitrust, and civil rights. But, as courts focus on dissimilarities among
plaintiffs and certify fewer class actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys are less

Merck’s actions. M. Gabrielle Hils, Defending Against the Onslaught of State Attorneys
General Actions Against Drug Manufacturers: Lessons Learned from Recent Cases, in Navigating Drug and Medical Device Legal Issues Leading Lawyers on Handling, Trademark,
Fraud, and Liability Concerns (2014), available at 2014 WL 2355616, at *12–13.
35
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012).
36
134 S. Ct. 736, 743 (2014).
37
Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General
in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2003–04 (2001).
38
E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach Nearly $1 Billion Agreement with SunTrust to Address Mortgage Loan Origination
As Well As Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (June 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/June/14-civ-638.html.
39
See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (listing
private attorney, Jonathan S. Massey, as representing the State of Mississippi); Donald G.
Gifford & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court, CAFA, and Parens Patriae Actions:
Will It Be Principles or Biases?, 92 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 1, 3 (2013) (“A parens patriae
action is filed by the state attorney general, but often with the assistance of private plaintiffs’
counsel specializing in mass tort actions.”).
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likely to invest their time and resources. 40 Without some change, enforcement gaps may persist and defendants will have no formal means to
prevent seriatim litigation, even after winning several cases.
C. Fallout from the Prism Effect
Whether this regulatory magnetism is optimal in terms of compensation and deterrence is a hotly debated normative and empirical question. 41 Yet, one need not wade too far into the substantive debate to appreciate the descriptive point that regulatory layers exist and those layers
affect aggregation’s procedural goals. Aggregation should not only enable regulators to enforce substantive rights, but encourage efficient resource use, generate binding resolutions, and produce accurate results
through trial and settlement. 42 Accordingly, of interest here is how procedural goals are affected by the shift away from plenary class certification and the potential for serial relitigation of common questions.
1. Settlement-Oriented Litigation
Increasingly strict certification standards have prompted plaintiffs’ attorneys to adopt two principal strategies: winnow the constellation of
40
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1273, 1283–91 (2012).
41
See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 Va. Envtl. L.J. 237, 286–300 (2011) (claiming that regulatory overlap
is an efficient way to ensure against regulatory gaps); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 891–92 (2006) (suggesting that regulatory overlap encourages
innovation and overcomes inertia); Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial
Regulation, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 537, 539 (2012) (suggesting that regulatory overlap between public and private regulators makes agency capture more difficult); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 63,
88–89 (2008) (arguing that securities class actions provide a public good and that integrating
public and private suits diminishes collective action problems, and agency inaction); William
W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons; A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa
L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2003) (expressing concern about under-regulation as a result of agencies
with overlapping jurisdiction); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1138–51 (2012) (arguing that overlapping agency jurisdiction can generate efficiency gains if coordinated); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative
State, 91 Geo. L.J. 757, 759–80 (2003) (highlighting problems with over-regulation). For an
excellent overview of the regulatory and adjectival conceptions of Rule 23, see David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90
Wash. U. L. Rev. 587, 592–98 (2013).
42
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 1.03 (2010).
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claims they seek to certify as a class, and “litigate” with an allencompassing aim toward settlement—whether as a settlement class action or an aggregate settlement through multidistrict litigation. 43
The trend toward leaving claims on the table itself has taken at least
two forms. 44 First, in employment-discrimination cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys have carved divisible, monetary remedies out of the class action
and requested that courts certify indivisible remedies, like declaratory
and injunctive relief, under Rule 23(b)(2). 45 Strategically, this not only
extricates the individualized questions that accompany divisible relief,
but it means that plaintiffs do not automatically receive notice or opt-out
rights, and that common questions need not predominate over individual
ones.
Second, where defective products like cars cause both personal injuries and economic damages, attorneys sever personal-injury claims
through their class definition and complaint. 46 This extracts individualized factual inquiries concerning things like driver error and road conditions from the predominance question while expanding the number of
class members. After all, more people will have suffered economic injury from a recalled or defective car’s diminished value than will experience personal injuries. But because economic damages are typically
founded in consumer-protection and breach-of-warranty claims, attorneys must convince courts that states’ laws are functionally equivalent
lest the choice-of-law question swamp Rule 23(b)(3)’s manageability
inquiry. 47
43

Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2245, 2288–89
(2008) (discussing settlement bias in multidistrict litigation).
44
Before CAFA, the trend was to forgo federal claims so as to avoid removal under federal question jurisdiction. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 748–49 (2005) (“The decision to disclaim any federal grounds for
relief can, of course, have a real impact on a plaintiff’s prospects for recovery.”).
45
Plaintiffs have begun requesting issue class certification as to the Rule 23(b)(2) claims.
See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012) (certifying an issue class, noting that some pecuniary relief might be suitable for class
treatment, and suggesting that even if not because Merrill Lynch’s brokers earn at least
$100,000 a year, individual claims would be worthwhile to pursue).
46
See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting plaintiffs’ request for economic damages, disgorgement, interest, and punitive damages stemming
from an air bag recall).
47
See, e.g., id. at 725 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the laws of the fifty-one jurisdictions are “virtually the same”); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg.,
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (denying
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Of course, manageability is a problem only if the class is certified for
trial. 48 Hence the rise of so-called “settlement class actions,” classes that
courts certify for settlement purposes only. 49 But settlement classes tip
the balance of power even further in defendants’ favor: Without plenary
class certification, plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot credibly threaten trial and
dissatisfied defendants can simply negotiate with other plaintiffs’ lawyers who would welcome settlement and the attorneys’ fees that accompany it. 50 Settlement classes likewise mean that the court will never fully
hear or adjudicate the dispute’s merits. 51 These combined circumstances
create a substantial risk that settlement classes will undervalue class
members’ claims. 52
Nonclass aggregate settlements fare no better. Removing class certification from the equation forces judges into murky territory; the same
principal-agent problems that Rule 23 confronts persist, but judges lack
clear policing authority. 53 When a judge certifies a class, Rule 23 bestows the power to appoint class counsel, ensure a fair settlement, and
award fees, all of which help prevent counsel from exploiting absent

plaintiffs’ request to apply California law as a precursor to a motion to certify a nationwide
class).
48
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Confronted with a request
for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if
tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no
trial.”).
49
See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2013
WL 499474, at *11 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2013) (certifying settlement class actions); In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 295 F.R.D. 112, 147 (E.D.
La. 2013) (certifying medical benefits settlement class action); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS
(FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (provisionally certifying a national settlement class for economic loss cases); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 931 (E.D. La. 2012) (certifying economic benefits settlement class action).
50
Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
951, 953 (2014); see also Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662
F.3d 913, 918 (2011) (“[W]e and other courts have often remarked the incentive of class
counsel, in complicity with the defendant’s counsel, to sell out the class . . . .”).
51
Erichson, supra note 50, at 953. Courts consider the merits only insofar as they overlap
with the certification requirements. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133
S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013).
52
Erichson, supra note 50, at 953.
53
As I have argued elsewhere, if judges awarded lead lawyers attorneys’ fees on a quantum-meruit theory, that would give judges a valid private law basis for monitoring settlements. Burch, supra note 1.
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class members. 54 But absent certification, the law treats aggregate settlements the same as other private settlements: Judges have no formal
authority. 55
Without standards and formal supervision, recent nonclass settlements
garnered through multidistrict litigation have suffered from self-dealing
provisions. Lead lawyers abuse their negotiating position by increasing
their attorneys’ fees via settlement (presumably by exchanging something
of value like lower settlement amounts or higher participation thresholds), 56 or inserting provisions that force participating attorneys to recommend that all their clients accept the settlement offer and withdraw from
representing those who refuse. 57 So, although clients are not absent as they
are in class actions, 58 their coerced “consent” to these settlements does not
legitimize the deal as it might in truly individual litigation. 59 Granted, certified class actions are not perfect either; their merits have been debated extensively. 60 But a certified class—even a certified issue class—has judicial
54

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g), (h), advisory committee’s notes.
Some judges have attempted to informally approve or disapprove nonclass settlements.
E.g., Transcript of Status Conference, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 4, 30,
36 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/Transcripts/11-907.pdf (convening judges with heavy Vioxx dockets to jointly announce and informally “approve” the settlement alongside lead lawyers). For commentary on this trend, see Burch, supra note 1, at 85, 116–17 n.236; Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class
Settlements, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1024 (2013) (“Claims belong to claimants, not to the
judge.”).
56
See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. La. 2008) (allowing lead lawyers to contract around the initial three-percent fee cap through the settlement agreement, but reducing the contractual eight percent to six-and-a-half percent); In re
Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05–1708, 2008 WL
682174, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (permitting the lead attorneys to “contract around”
the judge’s initial order on fees and increasing their fees substantially—from 2 to 14.4 percent, or by an extra $29.7 million). For more information, see Burch, supra note 1, at 80–81;
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing MultiDistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 107, 109 (2010).
57
Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.2.8, In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-01657, (E.D.
La. Nov. 9, 2007) (initial settlement agreement) (on file with the author). For the many ways
in which this agreement arguably ran afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 Cornell L. Rev.
265, 280–92 (2011).
58
Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The control of the class over
its lawyers usually is attenuated, often to the point of nonexistence.”).
59
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 506, 512–14 (2011); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 57, at 274–92.
60
See, e.g., Eubank, 753 F.3d at 719 (noting that the class is “a worthwhile supplement to
conventional litigation procedure” but that it is controversial “because it is frequently
abused”).
55
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quality-control measures and adequate representation checks that socalled “quasi class actions” lack. 61
2. Unpredictable Preclusion
As one might expect, when attorneys leave claims on the table or opt
for a settlement class action to leverage bargaining authority that does
not exist, dissatisfied plaintiffs will sue again. 62 When plaintiffs initiate
subsequent suits, they seek to avoid preclusion by claiming the representative inadequately represented them in the first suit. Multiple regulators escalate preclusion concerns. Defendants may hope to thwart continued litigation on a particular issue, private citizens might want to
recover compensation in the wake of a parens patriae action, or a state
attorney might wish to free ride on private counsel’s efforts.
Assessing adequate representation in the preclusion context is complicated when public regulators’ aims diverge from private claimants’
goals. For instance, public officials might exchange a rapid settlement
with splashy headlines for insubstantial contributions to victims, succumb to regulatory capture, distribute awards (if any) inequitably, or use
quick settlements to cover up regulatory missteps. 63 And though parens
patriae cases protect the public interest, 64 they lack Rule 23’s certification procedures, including the adequacy requirement. 65 Thus, when
parens patriae actions conclude first, no court has tested for intra-group
conflicts or conflicts between the state attorney and the citizens. 66

61

Burch, supra note 1, at 74, 112.
As the majority in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes observed, this “creates perverse incentives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid claims for monetary relief”
and “also create[s] the possibility . . . that individual class members’ compensatory-damages
claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart from.”
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
63
Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 486, 498 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corrective Justice State, 5 J. Tort L. 189, 217 (2014); Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue
Attorneys General, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2014, at A1.
64
Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (holding that a state
“must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State
must be more than a nominal party” and must “express a quasi-sovereign interest”).
65
Lemos, supra note 63, at 503. Some states have built adequacy requirements into their
statutory authority for prosecuting actions under parens patriae. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012) (barring subsequent citizen suits only if the “Administrator or State
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an enforcement action).
66
See infra Subsection III.C.3 for a proposed solution to this problem.
62
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Inadequate representation concerns were less prominent in traditional
parens patriae cases involving truly aggregate rights. When the state
sued to vindicate its citizens’ public interest in water, wildlife management, or public transit, 67 preclusion was straightforward: The resulting
judgment bound both the state and its citizens since the injury affected
the public as a whole. 68 But as defendants have exploited jurisdictional
imbalances and substantive and procedural limitations to their advantage, state attorneys have waded into murkier territory involving
nonstatutory, “quasi-sovereign” claims. 69 Departing from well-traveled
paths makes adequate representation and preclusion far less certain;
questions persist about whether consumers can “double dip,” and, if so,
how a defendant can ever achieve finality. 70
II. RECONSTITUTING CONDUCT BY RECONSIDERING COHESION
The crux of preclusion and adequate representation often hinges on
whether a class is cohesive, a term that lacks a clear definition despite its
central importance. Debuting in the 1966 Rules Advisory Committee’s

67

Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506–07, 509 (1932) (water rights); Berman v.
Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1952) (public transit); Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d 181 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (wildlife management).
68
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. at 506–07, 509.
69
See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 2, at 661–68 (urging the greater use of parens patriae
authority); Lemos, supra note 63, at 498 (raising inadequate representation issues). The Supreme Court has been enigmatic in defining the parameters of “quasi-sovereign” interests.
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601; 13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice &
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3531.11 (3d ed. 2008). As one commentator observed, “‘Quasisovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that
appellate courts sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a meaningless
term absolutely bereft of utility.” Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 Tul. L. Rev.
1847, 1851 (2000).
70
Compare In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No.
05-md-1712, 2013 WL 3463503, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (granting in part defendants’
motion to enjoin the Pennsylvania Attorney General from seeking restitution—but not other
forms of relief—in a civil enforcement proceeding after private plaintiffs entered into a class
action settlement), with Spinelli v. Capital One Bank, USA, No. 8:08-CV-132-T-33EAJ,
2012 WL 3609028, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2012) (declining to enjoin Mississippi and
Hawaii attorneys general from civil enforcement after a class action settlement and noting
that “the government is not bound by private litigation when the government’s action seeks
to enforce a[ ] statute that implicates both public and private interests”), and CFTC v. Commercial Hedge Servs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (D. Neb. 2006) (refusing to enjoin a
federal administrative agency from seeking restitution for private settlement-class members
because it was a public agency and therefore not bound by a private agreement).
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discussion, reporter Benjamin Kaplan suggested that notice and opt-out
rights in Rule 23(b)(3) could solve problems of weak intra-class unity. 71
But the Supreme Court’s subsequent approach to class cohesion has
been inconsistent at best. In Amchem Products v. Windsor, the Court
identified cohesion as part of the predominance inquiry under Rule
23(b)(3), 72 but a year later, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., it suggested
that cohesion was ensconced in Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which does not require predominance. 73 Then, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, the Court appeared to locate cohesion within Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality by requiring “some glue” holding employment decisions together. 74
So, while Rule 23’s text makes no mention of class cohesion, the
Court has imported homogeneity concerns into no less than three parts
of the Rule—but has not once defined what cohesion means. A close
reading of those opinions indicates that the term must refer to a class’s
internal unity, which qualifies a class to litigate as a single unit. 75 What’s
lacking, however, is any explanation of what counts as class unity, how
much is required, and why it matters. As I and others have theorized
elsewhere, cohesion and commonality are not synonymous, cohesion
cannot simply be a metric for justifying certification on judicial economy grounds, and cohesion likely serves to mitigate dignity and legitimacy concerns about undermining one’s day in court through representative litigation. 76

71

Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 391–94 (1967).
72
521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133
S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013) (“[P]roof of materiality is not required to establish that a proposed
class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’—the focus of the
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3).”).
73
527 U.S. 815, 858 (1999) (“[T]he determination whether ‘proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication’ must focus on ‘questions that preexist any settlement.’”).
74
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).
75
Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 651,
673–701 (2014).
76
Id.; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 265–69 (1992); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community,
and the Line Between, 58 Kan. L. Rev. 889, 894–99 (2010); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, DePaul L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 9–11, 14–18, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617355). As one can surmise from these different approaches, Professor Bone and I agree on a process-oriented view, but differ as to how that might play out,
particularly given my communitarian and procedural justice bent.
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Not surprisingly, lower courts and litigants have invoked cohesion
haphazardly, using a smattering of metrics to measure it. Courts have,
for example, seized upon class members’ physical characteristics to presume cohesion, 77 but being the same race or gender does not make a
group cohesive or its members’ interests uniform. 78 For instance, in desegregation and school busing cases, some class members wanted to improve local black schools instead of integrating, while others wanted to
avoid busing their children to integrated but violent schools. 79 Nevertheless, they were lumped into the same class of African Americans seeking
integration and busing. The same is true in both Title IX education and
Title VII employment-discrimination cases: There are female students
who are happy with the status quo and employees who prefer not to sue
at all. 80 But they are presumed cohesive and included within the class.
Even in securities classes where race and gender are not at issue, courts
implement multifactor tests to gauge whether lead plaintiffs are cohesive—all the while overlooking the need for lead plaintiffs to represent
class members’ diverse interests. 81 Each of these artificial proxies leads
courts astray from what truly connects the plaintiffs: the defendant’s
conduct towards them and plaintiffs’ shared interest in holding the defendant accountable. 82
77
See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (positing
that the Rule 23(b)(2) “class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogeneous and cohesive group with few conflicting interests among its members”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 87, 110 (2011).
78
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 Fordham L. Rev.
3043, 3047–48 (2013).
79
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 471–72 (1976); Leo Crowley, Due Process Rights of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions—The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest,
59 B.U. L. Rev. 661, 666–80 (1979) (arguing that the divergent interests in Title VII cases
cause inadequate representation).
80
See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 192 F.R.D. 568, 574 (W.D.
Mich. 1999) (recognizing the possibility “that members of the class have no desire to pursue
this action, and are not unhappy with the status quo”).
81
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1109, 1111, 1141–
42, 1151–55 (2011); e.g., Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, 589 F. Supp. 2d 388,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (using the following test to evaluate cohesion: “(1) the existence of a prelitigation relationship between group members; (2) involvement of the group members in the
litigation thus far; (3) plans for cooperation; (4) the sophistication of its members; and (5)
whether the members chose outside counsel, and not vice versa”).
82
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The [majority’s] ‘dissimilarities’ approach leads the Court to train its attention on what distinguishes individual class
members, rather than on what unites them. . . .”).
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To be sure, claimants may have genuine bonds or social connections
that pre-date the litigation, such as labor unions in the asbestos litigation,
support groups in the tainted blood products litigation, veterans’ groups
in the Agent Orange litigation, or citizens committees in the Buffalo
Creek disaster. 83 And, with the advent of the Internet and social media,
even geographically dispersed litigants might associate with one another
after filing suit, form groups, and effectively govern themselves. 84 So,
while it is possible for cohesive groups to pre-date or post-date the lawsuit, that does not change what unified plaintiffs for adjudication purposes: a defendant’s actions. 85
Identifying a defendant’s alleged conduct as what often bonds plaintiffs reorients traditional thinking about class cohesion and frees courts
to think pragmatically about how to situate, sort, and adjudicate the particular components of any claim. 86 Classifying claims and defenses into
their constituent parts and goals—to either regulate a defendant’s conduct or determine a plaintiff’s eligibility for relief—serves two purposes.
First, it illuminates how aggregate proof can interact with substantive
law to establish a defendant’s common conduct or mask individual differences in proving plaintiffs’ eligibility components. Second, it sets the
stage for courts to use issue classes to adjudicate components relating to
a defendant’s uniform conduct as well as plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief
when it can be satisfied with aggregate proof.
A. Defendant’s Conduct Components Versus Plaintiff’s
Eligibility Components
Recasting the elements of a claim or defense into conduct components
and eligibility components can facilitate sensible and procedurally legitimate outcomes. 87 In most situations, the term “component” will be in83

Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private
Gain 298 (2000) (describing the hemophiliac community’s HIV litigation); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (2009).
84
Burch, supra note 77, at 119–21 (citing examples).
85
Actual cohesion may justify imposing moral or legal obligations on group members.
Burch, supra note 83, at 17–20.
86
I have elaborated on the day-in-court participation aspects of this proposal elsewhere.
Burch, Calibrating Participation, supra note 76, at 18–22.
87
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1439–40 (1995) (“[T]he class action would resolve only the
issues of liability and generic causation. Each plaintiff would still be required to prove in a
separate trial the facts demonstrating individual causation in that plaintiff’s case (for exam-
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terchangeable with what we consider a legal element. But evaluating a
design defect under a risk-utility standard, for instance, commingles a
defendant’s conduct in creating a product with how consumers interact
with it. Thus, “component” is a more precise locution devised to reflect
the occasional circumstance in which a single legal element cannot be
classified holistically.
“Conduct components” concern the defendant’s conduct: what a defendant knew, when the defendant knew it, whether a defendant used biased hiring procedures, what changes a corporation made to a product,
or how a corporation labeled and advertised a product. In tort law, general causation might classify as a conduct component because it tests
whether a defendant’s product is capable of causing the harm alleged.
When a defendant’s actions are uniform and nonindividuated, conduct
components are common to all people affected by those actions and are
thus theoretically ripe for aggregate treatment. 88 Put differently, adding
or subtracting a particular plaintiff when adjudicating a defendant’s con-

ple, that the plaintiff was occupationally exposed to asbestos for a sufficient period to cause
the claimed injury or illness).”); cf. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note
42, § 2.01 cmt. c (characterizing common issues as arising with respect to “upstream” matters and individual issues cropping up in “downstream” matters “centered upon the individual situations of those claimants themselves”).
88
See, e.g., In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
2014) (noting that liability issues related to defendant’s conduct were “suited to class-wide
resolution”); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 804, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting
“the district court set forth a considerable list of issues that were common to all the class
members’ claims. Nearly all of these issues related to either the complicated factual questions surrounding BP’s involvement in the well design, explosion, discharge of oil, and
cleanup efforts” and that those issues were certifiable despite “the particular need in such
cases for individualized damages calculations”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding certification based on defendant’s militarycontractor defense); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (“The class members’ claims all arise from allegations regarding a
common defect. Moreover, the class members’ claims derive from similar or identical warranties and are based on common advertisements and representations regarding their vehicles.”); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[A]s to the vitamin product class, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants have participated in a unitary
overarching conspiracy which encompassed a number of identified vitamins.”); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 279–80 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (certifying a class action
based on defendant’s state-of-the-art defense); see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and
Due Process, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1059, 1068–69 (2012); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class
Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393, 428–29
(2000).
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duct should have no effect on the proceedings because conduct components have nothing to do with the plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief. 89
When private plaintiffs sue, they must also demonstrate certain individuated “eligibility components” entitling them to the relief they request. Some eligibility components like reliance, specific causation
(proximate cause), and damages fall upon plaintiffs to prove because
they are part and parcel of the claim itself. Other eligibility components
concern affirmative defenses and require that defendants prove them—
statute of limitations or assumption of the risk, for example. 90 Because
these elements define which plaintiffs were legally harmed by a defendant’s conduct and by how much, they are more individuated than conduct components. Nevertheless, certain substantive doctrines have eliminated this variability. The fraud-on-the-market doctrine in securities
class actions provides an apt example. Without it, each purchaser would
have to prove that she relied on a company’s misstatements, thereby defeating the possibility of a securities class action; with it, the fraud is incorporated into the efficient market’s price and those who traded during
a particular period satisfy reliance by relying on the market’s integrity. 91
Requests for remedial relief can be classified along similar lines. Divisible remedies, such as compensatory damages, tend to be plaintiffspecific and flow from establishing eligibility components. 92 Indivisible
remedies, on the other hand, such as injunctive or declaratory relief,
yield uniform results to claimants because they relate to the defendant’s
conduct, not—as some courts and commentators have maintained—
because class members themselves share cohesive physical traits. 93
89
See Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If there are
genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it
makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issue in one fell swoop
while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issue to individual follow-on proceedings.”).
90
Granted, if the statute of limitations issue turns on intentional concealment or wrongdoing by the defendant then it could be a conduct component.
91
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014); Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
92
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.04(a) (“Divisible
remedies are those that entail the distribution of relief to one or more claimants individually,
without determining in practical effect the application or availability of the same remedy to
any other claimant.”).
93
This is slightly different from the view espoused by the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. Section 2.04 helpfully distinguishes between divisible and indivisible remedies, but defines what is and is not divisible based on the claimant’s relationship to the remedy. Id. § 2.04(a), (b) (“Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to
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Granted, there is an eligibility component to indivisible remedies: A
court must be able to identify the class of people entitled to enforce the
declaratory or injunctive relief and must likewise be able to preclude
that group from relitigating the same questions. While those determinations require the certifying court to be precise in defining the class, 94
they should not affect the certification inquiry itself.
To illustrate the basic conduct versus eligibility classification process,
consider a few substantive examples from securities, consumer protection, and employment cases. 95 Proving securities fraud under Rule 10b-5
requires plaintiffs to introduce evidence of three conduct-related components: defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission; 96 defendant’s
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud (scienter); 97 and a connection
between defendant’s material misconduct and a securities transaction. 98
But to make a prima facie case of securities fraud, private plaintiffs must
also prove eligibility components, including a connection between their
purchase or sale and the defendant’s misconduct, their reliance on the
misconduct, and both economic and loss causation, which demonstrate a
causal relationship between the material misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s loss. 99
The conduct components in proving a breach of warranty claim involving an allegedly defective product can be classified similarly: Proving that a defendant issued and breached a warranty—so long as the issuance was standardized across the product in question—might be done

any claimant as a practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.”).
94
See infra Subsection III.A.3 (discussing ascertainability).
95
Many of these examples are federal theories where the conduct component is relatively
uniform throughout the country. State laws may differ in ways that emphasize different evidence. Thus, one must consider whether an issue class using states’ laws will materially advance the claims’ resolution and whether choice-of-law problems can be overcome by, for
instance delineating two or three issue classes that take variations into account. These concerns are addressed in more detail in Subsections III.A.1 and III.A.2 respectively.
96
Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); Levinson, 485 U.S. at 231–32.
97
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
98
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities
Regulation § 12.5, at 481–83 (rev. 5th ed. 2014); e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d
638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
99
Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341–42; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 Md. L. Rev. 348, 350–51 (2007).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1878

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1855

uniformly. 100 Eligibility components vary by state, but often include
proving loss or injury to the plaintiff-buyer and a causal connection between the breach of warranty and the plaintiff’s loss. 101 So, if plaintiffs
alleged that a defendant’s design modifications to a washing machine
caused it to accumulate mold and thereby violated the defendant’s warranty, 102 or if a defendant asserted that its product met industry standards, 103 those allegations concern common conduct components. 104
Title VII employment-discrimination cases illustrate the fallacy of letting eligibility components doom class treatment of conduct-related
components. Plaintiffs must principally prove that a defendant’s conduct
disparately impacted a protected class by pointing to something like a
company-wide policy, 105 a common practice, or a single manager who
made personnel decisions. 106 But courts have used faulty reasoning to
disintegrate this uniformity. In Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the
100
See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d
838, 853 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that in Ohio, “plaintiffs must prove that (1) a defect existed
in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant; (2) the defect existed at the time the
product left the defendant’s hands; and (3) the defect directly and proximately caused the
plaintiff’s injury or loss”); Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1424 (4th Cir.
1985) (interpreting Maryland law to require proof of the warranty, breach of that warranty,
and harm proximately caused by the breach); Nieberding v. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc.,
302 F.R.D. 600, 618 (D. Kan. 2014) (“Here there is essentially one central, common issue of
liability: whether the plastic brackets designed by Barrette and sold by Home Depot were
defective.”); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495, 497 (N.C. 1987) (interpreting North Carolina law to require plaintiff to prove that there was a warranty, the goods did
not comply with the warranty, the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defective goods, and
that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result).
101
Klein, 773 F.2d at 1424; Morrison, 354 S.E.2d at 497.
102
See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The
basic question presented by the mold claim—are the machines defective in permitting mold
to accumulate and generate noxious odors?—is common to the entire mold class, although
damages are likely to vary across class members (the owners of the washing machines).”); In
re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 846 (“The plaintiffs’ causes of action rest on the central allegation that all of the Duets share a common design defect—the machines fail to clean
properly their own mechanical components to eliminate soil and residue deposits known as
‘biofilm.’”).
103
In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2014).
104
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
105
E.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489–
90 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing the denial of class certification as to defendant’s teaming and
account distribution policies).
106
See, e.g., Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the district court erred by not certifying a class of black employees who complained
that the plant’s top supervisors told them nothing would be done in response to pervasive
hostility and harassment).
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit claimed that: “The underlying premise of the (b)(2) class—that its members suffer from a common
injury properly addressed by classwide relief—‘begins to break down
when the class seeks to recover back pay or other forms of monetary relief.’” 107 A defendant’s conduct toward a protected group is no less
common when that group seeks divisible remedies. Nor does the request
for monetary relief change the basic calculus of whether litigating plaintiffs’ allegations as to a defendant’s conduct will “resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 108 Rather,
the trouble comes in litigating conduct and eligibility components in a
single, class-wide proceeding.
Title VII cases have also suffered from remedial requests that do not
fall neatly into a divisible or indivisible category. Punitive damages punish a defendant’s pattern of discriminatory behavior toward certain employees and hinge on whether plaintiffs can establish the wrongfulness
of a defendant’s conduct toward the class as a whole. 109 Yet recent Supreme Court cases on punitive damages and Title VII seem to tie punitive damages to eligibility components. 110 Each employee is eligible for
up to $300,000 in punitive damages, but must demonstrate that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination “with malice or
107
151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).
108
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
109
See, e.g., Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 438 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(focusing on defendant’s conduct as opposed to the class members’ individualized harms);
Barefield v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., No. C 86-2427TEH, 1988 WL 188433, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1988) (“A class claim for punitive damages does not detract from the homogeneity
or cohesiveness of the class. Rather, it is consistent with the notion that the focus of a (b)(2)
action is the defendant’s conduct toward persons sharing a common characteristic. Because
the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim, but to punish and deter the
defendant, any claim for such damages hinges, not on facts unique to each class member, but
on the defendant’s conduct toward the class as a whole.”); cf Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d at 417 (refusing to decide whether punitive damages are available on a class-wide basis).
110
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), Phillip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471
(2008), can each be read to suggest that punitive damages remedy individual injuries. The
upshot of Williams is that punitive-damage awards can punish the defendant’s wrongdoing
only as to a particular plaintiff, not as to those similarly situated. 549 U.S. at 353–54. Exxon
Shipping Co. and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance both indicate that punitive-damage
awards must be tethered to compensatory damages (or, at the very least, backpay). Exxon,
554 U.S. at 514; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The
Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 845, 849 (2010).
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with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 111 Thus, some have argued that plaintiffs must
demonstrate individual injuries to receive punitive damages. 112
Punitive damages straddle the conceptual line between conduct and
eligibility in tort law as well; classifying them often entails examining
the underlying substantive doctrine. For example, states have reached
conflicting outcomes on punitive damages in tobacco cases. In California, an individual’s punitive-damage claim arises out of her own personal and emotional injuries, and thus qualifies as an eligibility component. 113 But in New York, punitive damages are firmly tethered to the
defendant’s conduct: they aim to deter wrongful conduct, punish misbehavior for the public good, and benefit the general public—not private
parties. 114 Plaintiffs must demonstrate “grave misconduct affecting the
public generally” as opposed to an “individually sustained wrong.” 115
Thus, punitive damages are conduct components that could be adjudicated collectively.
Harder cases like medical monitoring can likewise benefit from this
conduct versus eligibility classification. Medical monitoring varies from
state to state, but the heart of the claim goes to defendant’s conduct: A
defendant has put people in peril by exposing them to a harmful substance and therefore has an obligation to minimize future risk of injury
by covering medical-monitoring costs. Medical monitoring is thus akin
to other affirmative tort duties. If a driver runs someone off the road at
night but does not injure her, yet drives off instead of shining his headlights in her direction, the driver is liable if the victim subsequently falls
off a cliff. 116 The driver’s failure to shine his headlights is a conduct
component, whereas the victim’s proof of subsequent injury is an eligi111

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), (b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
E.g., Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d at 417 (noting that the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could be interpreted this way, but declining to reach the question).
113
Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
114
Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 653 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Fabiano v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 54 A.D.3d 146, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Grill v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 481, 498 (S.D.N.Y 2009); Shea v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 73 A.D.3d 730, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
115
Fabiano, 54 A.D.3d at 150; see also Grill, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 498; Shea, 73 A.D.3d at
732. Some states even require a percentage of punitive damages to be paid into the state’s
treasury. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2015) (requiring 75% of punitive damages awarded to be paid into the State treasury).
116
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1625,
1710 (2002).
112
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bility component. Similarly, in medical monitoring the defendant’s behavior in creating and exposing plaintiffs to a hazardous substance is “a
primary duty of conduct,” 117 not “a secondary duty to compensate,” 118
which would be an eligibility component.
B. Aggregate Proof
Identifying and labeling the parts in any claim or defense as either
conduct or eligibility components properly reorients, in the abstract, the
notion of collectively determining whether the defendant’s conduct was
wrongful, even if that conduct affects plaintiffs differently. Courts are
more likely to certify a class when plaintiffs offer proof (or a disputed
legal question) that applies to all of them equally. 119 But moving from
the abstract to the specific raises questions about how plaintiffs prove
the defendant’s conduct—whether through aggregate, “top-down” proof
about the defendant’s act or acts, or individual, “bottom-up” proof that
reveals the defendant’s true colors only by demonstrating how the defendant treated similarly situated individuals. It also raises questions
about the legitimacy of de-emphasizing variances among eligibility
components through statistical proof.
To smooth over differences in individual proof, plaintiffs’ attorneys
have employed two principal strategies. First, they have argued that the
underlying substantive doctrine facilitates aggregate treatment by, for
example, bootstrapping disparate state law claims into a uniform federal
cause of action. 120 Second, they have deployed statistical models to
transform individual “bottom-up” proof of the defendant’s conduct or
classic eligibility components like damages into something that appears
common. As such, decentralized wrongs might seem uniform and plaintiffs could dispense with individual proof. 121
117

Id.
Id. at 1710–11.
119
This discussion of conduct versus eligibility components does not explicitly address
disputed legal questions that might apply to all plaintiffs or all defendants, such as whether a
market-share theory of liability might apply to asbestos cases or whether the statute of limitations should be extended because of the defendant’s intentional concealment. But the
omission is not meant to exclude legal questions from consideration, particularly if resolving
them en masse would materially advance the claims’ resolution as Subsection III.A.1 describes.
120
See infra notes 122–30.
121
See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]redominance
is met ‘when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a sim118
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Consider a prototypical example first. In securities fraud cases, when
a defendant makes a single, material fraudulent statement (the conduct
component), investors will experience different damages and some may
not be harmed at all (eligibility components). If each plaintiff sued individually, courts would hear similar evidence of the defendant’s misconduct repeatedly. The evidence used to prove the defendant’s misstatement, in other words, is functionally equivalent and could be proven
collectively. But substantive doctrines like fraud-on-the-market and statistical methods for modeling damages also make it possible for plaintiffs to collectively prove eligibility components like reliance and damages. The procedural effect is that common questions tend to
predominate over individual ones, making securities class actions easier
to certify under Rule 23(b)(3).
The trick then is to replicate that result in other cases: to repackage
ordinary breach of contract or negligence claims into substantive law
like RICO or medical monitoring where courts focus on defendant’s
conduct, not individual harms. 122 For example, after early efforts to certify negligence claims against tobacco companies failed to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance, 123 plaintiffs tried to use medical monitoring to
shift the court’s attention to the defendant’s wrongful conduct and away
from smokers’ individual circumstances. 124 But the class in Barnes v.
American Tobacco Co. was reversed on appeal. Defining class membership based on whether one was addicted to nicotine introduced eligibility
components and unraveled the focus on defendants’ conduct. 125 In Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., however, attorneys successfully de-

ultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class members’ individual position.’” (quoting In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D.
Minn. 1995))); Nagareda, supra note 24, at 101–02 (“[A]ggregate proof then seeks to trigger
the application of substantive doctrine in such a way as to suggest a common, class-wide
wrong attributable to the defendant.”).
122
See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199–1200 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (considering RICO
claims in conjunction with other economic damage claims).
123
See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying an issue class as to core liability issues for failing to meet the predominance standard).
124
Nagareda, supra note 24, at 119.
125
161 F.3d 127, 145 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Gargano v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 1024042, 2011 WL 2445869, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011) (decertifying a medical monitoring
class under Florida law); Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-CV-224(CBA)(SMG),
2011 WL 338425, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011) (decertifying a medical monitoring class under New York law).
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fined the medical-monitoring class using pack years 126 and targeted the
defendant’s conduct under Massachusetts law, which simply required
plaintiffs to show “that an available design modification would reduce
risk.” 127
Tobacco plaintiffs used RICO in much the same way as medical monitoring. Portraying their injury in economic terms based on the cigarette
market allowed plaintiffs to downplay eligibility components. 128 At the
time, RICO required individual proof of reliance and proximate cause
(both eligibility components), which doomed the predominance inquiry
on appeal. 129 But the Supreme Court later clarified that RICO plaintiffs
need not show reliance either “as an element of [their] claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation.” 130 Thus, the gambit might
gain more traction today.
Similar strategies for aggregating proof can be seen in employment
discrimination under Title VII. When the defendant’s conduct affects
plaintiffs uniformly through a single policy for assigning accounts to
brokers or a biased testing procedure, that evidence is common across
the class. 131 Declaratory or injunctive relief can then remedy uniform
conduct.
But sometimes an employer’s conduct comes into focus only if the
court takes a bird’s eye view of multiple plaintiffs’ claims. Because most
corporations have eliminated blatantly racist or sexist policies, a pattern
or practice may emerge only by considering a series of individual circumstances. The proof is not aggregate proof. Like pointillism, the full
picture emerges not from a single dot but from proving how an employer
treated many different individuals. Yet judges tend to deny class certification in these cases because they characterize them as separate discrim-

126
“[A] ‘pack-year’ is the average number of packs of cigarettes smoked per day multiplied by the number of years the person has smoked. One pack a day for twenty years, for
example, equals twenty pack-years.” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234DJC, 2012 WL 957633, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012).
127
Id. at *25.
128
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1127–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2006);
Nagareda, supra note 24, at 145.
129
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 223–28 (2d Cir. 2008).
130
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656 (2008).
131
E.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982) (suggesting biased testing
procedures would satisfy commonality and typicality); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (certifying account distribution and teaming policies).
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ination claims stemming from an array of individual incidents. 132 Thus,
courts have properly denied certification in cases like Rutstein v. Avis
Rent-A-Car Systems, where plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the individualized circumstances of why they were denied car rentals to show
religious animus on Avis’s part, 133 and Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose,
Inc., where each plaintiff would have to prove why they were denied accommodations or given dirty hotel rooms to show racial discrimination. 134
Accordingly, Title VII litigants increasingly invoke statistical proof to
magically transform what might ordinarily be seen as a “bottom-up,”
noncertifiable claim into one that looks common across the corpus of
plaintiffs in a “top-down” fashion. Take the evidence presented in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, for example. 135 Wal-Mart had an antidiscrimination policy, but plaintiffs alleged that the tap-on-the-shoulder
practice of giving supervisors promotion discretion disparately impacted
female employees. 136 Plaintiffs’ lawyers offered anecdotal experiences
and economic regression analyses showing “statistically significant disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart [that] . . . can be explained only by gender discrimination.” 137 If offered alone, plaintiffs’
anecdotal experiences would be no different than Rutstein or Motel 6—
factfinders could infer wrongdoing on Wal-Mart’s part only by first considering each employee’s experience and then taking a bird’s eye view
of that collective evidence. But the economic regression analysis tried to
132
Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing certification on
breach of contract claims because commonalities were outweighed by individual issues), abrogated on other grounds by Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639.
133
211 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying class certification because “[e]ach
plaintiff [would] have to bring forth evidence demonstrating that the defendant had an intent
to treat him or her less favorably because of the plaintiff’s Jewish ethnicity”).
134
130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying class certification because plaintiffs’
proof would have “require[d] distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding
each alleged incident of discrimination”).
135
Nagareda, supra note 24, at 156.
136
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
137
Id. at 2554–56. Plaintiffs also introduced a social framework analysis, but it was
plagued by credibility and reliability questions. See John Monahan, Laurens Walker &
Gregory Mitchell, The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 L., Probability & Risk 307,
308 (2009) (noting that “general social science research can provide a valuable context for
deciding case-specific factual issues” but those findings “cannot be linked by an expert witness to the facts of a specific case;” rather, those links “must be recognized as arguments to
be made by the attorneys, rather than evidentiary proof that can be offered by expert witnesses”).
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do this for the factfinder; it created aggregate workforce data by comparing the number of women promoted with the number of women in the
hourly worker pool. 138 Nevertheless, the illusion of aggregate proof
failed.
When a defendant’s conduct is decentralized and requires proof of the
plaintiffs’ individual circumstances, attempts to mask heterogeneity
through statistical proof do not fare well. And, as a procedural mechanism, issue classes should not change that result. But the tobacco examples are different. They illustrate ways in which plaintiffs’ lawyers engineer substantive doctrine to isolate defendant’s conduct and facilitate
aggregate resolution. The conduct itself was uniform—either tobacco
companies manipulated nicotine levels or they did not. The eligibility
components were the problem: Adjudicating plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief alongside defendant’s conduct risked undermining aggregate treatment altogether. In situations like these, issue classes can perform some
heavy lifting by divorcing conduct components from eligibility components and situating the former for certification.
C. Implications for Issue Classes
This discussion of conduct versus eligibility components and aggregate proof has at least six critical implications for issue classes. First, the
obvious: When the underlying substantive law discards individualized
proof as to eligibility components, it makes it possible to certify otherwise disparate issues for aggregate adjudication. Those issues can likewise add to the tableau of commonalities under Rule 23(b)(3). The same
is true when substantive law, like RICO, focuses judges’ attention on a
defendant’s conduct as opposed to plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief.
Second, the circumstances under which plaintiffs offer statistical and
economic proof should inform its effect on certification. When the underlying law governing eligibility components already treats plaintiffs as
a unit (think fraud-on-the-market in securities cases or reliance in
RICO), offering expert models is logical and widely accepted, provided
they are reliable under Daubert. 139 But plaintiffs have also offered statistical and economic models to satisfy substantive law that ordinarily de138

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas
of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1041, 1065–79 (2004).
139
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mands individual proof. This move seeks to agglomerate individual eligibility components via expert testimony and statistical methodology.
In both Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend
the Supreme Court rejected agglomerated evidence of conduct and eligibility components, respectively. As to conduct components, Wal-Mart’s
practice of giving supervisors discretion over hiring and promotion decisions eliminated the possibility of common proof via an official topdown policy. Thus, to prove a disparate impact, plaintiffs had to show
that supervisors exercised their discretion in a discriminatory way. But
to do that without offering a series of individual factual scenarios that,
taken together, painted a picture of sex discrimination required agglomerated economic regression analyses. When deconstructed, however, that
analysis was similar to Rutstein and Motel 6—the defendant’s conduct
was not uniform. 140
In Comcast, antitrust plaintiffs had to prove their damages—an eligibility component. To do so, they introduced a damage model. The problem here, however, was not the use of agglomerated proof, per se, but
that the model took all four of plaintiffs’ antitrust theories into account
as opposed to the only theory certified for class treatment—the overbuilder theory. 141 But the takeaway here is different from Dukes. Because the defect stemmed from an evidentiary question of reliability, 142
reliable models could still eliminate the need to adjudicate plaintiffs’
damages individually. Put simply, when agglomerated evidence tries to
turn a defendant’s decentralized conduct toward discrete individuals into
uniform conduct, the illusion fails. But when a defendant’s common
conduct injures plaintiffs, plaintiffs might successfully introduce reliable
statistical methods to prove eligibility for damages so long as substantive law permits aggregate proof.
Third, situating a defendant’s conduct as what glues class members
together, regardless of the type of class, may unify what might otherwise
be a disparate group of people and inform the commonality inquiries

140
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing Motel 6 and Rutstein).
141
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013).
142
As the dissenters in Comcast point out, Comcast never objected to the damage model.
Id. at 1436–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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under both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). 143 Even though some class members
may have bonds that pre- or post-date the litigation, that bond is not
what commonality tests: It tests cohesiveness for adjudication. So, as
Dukes requires, class-wide proceedings that adjudicate a defendant’s
conduct can generate common answers and help resolve the litigation. 144
Fourth, when plaintiffs request indivisible relief to alleviate a defendant’s conduct, partial certification might fall within Rule 23(b)(2)’s
mandatory ambit. 145 Rule 23(b)(2) requires the defendant to have “acted
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 146 Setting aside eligibility components
such as damage claims and focusing on declaratory or injunctive relief
can pave the way to certify a mandatory class even in cases like consumer fraud. For example, in Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, plaintiffs created
a permissible, nationwide (b)(2) class requesting six declarations centering on whether the defendant’s windows were defective, but left eligibility components like proximate cause and damages for individual determination. 147
Some might claim that this creates a due process problem: Losing a
mandatory issue class could preclude individual damage trials without
affording members the right to opt out under Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts. 148 But this view misunderstands the distinction between uniform
and decentralized misconduct. As Dukes, Motel 6, and Rutstein illustrate, decentralized conduct cannot be raised or adjudicated in class-wide
proceedings; 149 individual claims should not be certified or precluded.
But if the defendant’s conduct is uniform, a mandatory issue class can
143

In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 816 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the commonalities as to defendant’s conduct could be tried separately from liability issues and that it
was thus “‘possible to satisfy the predominance . . . requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in a mass
tort or mass accident class action’ despite the particular need in such cases for individualized
damages calculations”).
144
See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
145
E.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010); Allan v. Int’l Truck &
Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2004).
146
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
147
Pella Corp., 606 F.3d at 392–93.
148
472 U.S. 797, 811–12 n.3 (1985) (requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an
opportunity to opt out when an action seeks to bind plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or
predominantly for money judgments but not extending that view to equitable class actions).
149
See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
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level the playing field and avoid inconsistent judgments so long as the
substantive doctrine does not vary much from state to state. 150 Thus, unless plaintiffs were inadequately represented, their damage claims
should be precluded if the defendant wins. 151
Fifth, distinguishing between conduct and eligibility components informs not only commonality, but Rule 23(a)’s other queries as well.
Typicality tests whether a defendant’s conduct toward the class representative is typical of how a defendant’s conduct affected other class
members and thus screens decentralized conduct. 152 Numerosity considers whether the group affected by a defendant’s conduct is so widespread that representative litigation makes sense. 153 And the adequate
representation requirement, which often poses a stumbling block, should
prove less disruptive when courts certify conduct components. Most disabling conflicts arise from eligibility components like reliance, loss causation, and damages, which tend to be more individuated. 154 When
courts just certify a defendant’s conduct, they should tolerate greater
conflicts because plaintiffs share an objective focus on establishing a defendant’s liability. Thus, unless class counsel acts contrary to the class’s
best interest or attempts to represent an over-inclusive group where the

150

See infra Subsection III.B.2 (discussing resource parity and outcome equality).
See infra notes 334–42 and accompanying text (discussing inadequate representation).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
153
Id. 23(a)(1).
154
See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Despite this court’s view to the contrary, appellate class action decisions have held that issues
of reliance, loss-causation, and injury are inappropriate for aggregation, due to the need to
prove these elements on an individualized basis for each victim or injured party.”) (citing
decisions). See generally Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42,
§ 2.02 cmt. a (“[A]ccumulated experience with the class-action device suggests that aggregate treatment of a common issue will materially advance the resolution of multiple civil
claims more frequently when the issue concerns ‘upstream’ matters focused on the generally
applicable conduct of those opposing the claimants in the litigation as distinct from ‘downstream’ matters focused on those claimants themselves.”).
151
152
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requested relief could be detrimental to some class members, 155 representation should be adequate. 156
Finally, there are two precautions. First, certifying an issue class
should not become a backdoor to plenary certification via a settlement
class action. If judges conduct their issue class inquiry as this Article
suggests, then certifying a settlement class must entail a separate Rule
23 analysis. Because settlement classes encompass all aspects of a case,
they can raise new intra-class conflicts. Moreover, a distinct certification
analysis serves as an additional safeguard against weak lawyers negotiating and certifying weak settlements. Second, when conduct components and eligibility components are intertwined within a single legal element, issue classes should not serve as an excuse to create “sterile”
trials. For instance, in design-defect cases, states often employ a riskutility test that considers the product’s utility to the public and the individual user. Consequently, evaluating a defendant’s liability may necessitate not only assessing whether a safer and reasonably priced alternative
existed, but also testimony from exemplar plaintiffs about the product’s
utility—or lack thereof.

155

See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (attempting to include blacks within
a class seeking to enforce a racially restrictive covenant); Spano v. Boeing Co., 633 F.3d
574, 587 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that many proposed class members had no complaint about
ERISA investment opportunities and would be harmed by the relief the named plaintiffs requested); Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing
that the proposed class included people who claimed they were harmed by the same acts that
benefitted others).
156
Burch, supra note 78, at 3044, 3061. Conflicts over eligibility elements include issues
like differences over remedies and insurance coverage. E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (subclassing a class action
because of different statutes of limitation); Maloney v. Califano, 88 F.R.D. 293, 294–95
(D.N.M. 1980) (subclassing based on the time taken by the government to make individual
disability determinations). As to how remedies might divide members, if some claimants required immediate medical attention, they would receive far less benefit from a settlement
that provided research funds. See generally Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (including claimants who had to have their heart valve removed immediately and thus did not benefit from the settlement’s research and development fund without
special representation); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Mass Tort Settlement Class
Actions: Five Case Studies 43 (1998) (expressing concern over the lack of separate representation in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.).
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III. THE PARITY AND PROMISE OF ISSUE CLASSES
Making the analytical move toward understanding and classifying the
elements in any claim or defense as related to either a defendants’ conduct or plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief, combined with an understanding
of how the methods for proving those components can contribute to or
undermine their aggregate nature sets the stage for courts’ greater use of
issue classes. Issue classes can circumvent the mismatch between private
attorneys’ regulatory reach in light of stricter certification standards and
a defendant’s nationwide conduct. 157 Currently, even when a defendant
acts uniformly, eligibility components inject variances that have rendered class certification unlikely. But issue classes can do what plaintiffs’ attorneys have tried to accomplish through manipulating substantive law and representing only a subset of claims: They can spotlight a
defendant’s conduct. Issue classes are thus well positioned to eliminate
the most egregious aspects of the prism effect, recapture for both public
and private regulators what is common to all of them, and resolve a defendants’ conduct on the merits.
Nevertheless, a host of logistical, doctrinal, and political questions
remains. These questions range from the mechanics of Rule 23, parties’
incentives, and accuracy and fairness considerations to the pragmatics of
issue classes in multidistrict litigation. Accordingly, this Part explores
the following questions: When are issue classes appropriate within Rule
23’s framework and how do choice-of-law concerns affect that inquiry?
How can fees incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate issue classes
when the compensation structure is predicated on the presence of a
common fund? How can defendants be assured of two-way preclusion?
Might additional error-correcting mechanisms prevent undue settlement
pressure? How and when should transferee judges remand cases to transferor courts? And can issue classes coordinate the public and private
regulatory response while preventing Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns?

157
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Experts Say Recent Seventh Circuit Ruling May Not Make ‘Issue Certification’ Trendy, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 9, 2012) (quoting Professor
John C. Coffee, Jr., “I have long argued that ‘partial’ or ‘issue’ certification is the only way
out of the dilemma created by the increasingly rigid judicial interpretation of the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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A. Constructing Functional Issue Classes
Despite the promise of issue classes, in years past, courts and commentators diverged over whether and when to certify them. Those divisions stemmed, in part, from the scant guidance in Rule 23(c)(4), which
simply states, “When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” 158 Judges thus
created a substantial body of federal common law to fill in the gaps, but
their initial solutions were haphazard and varied. Recent years have witnessed a greater convergence on that front, but new divisions over
whether class members are “ascertainable” have sparked different debates. 159
1. Materially Advancing the Resolution of the Claim
Courts’ once sharp divisions over whether and when to certify issue
classes have softened substantially in the wake of Comcast and Dukes.
Several recent appellate decisions suggest a greater willingness to certify
issue classes in toxic torts, 160 product liability, 161 consumer protection, 162
and employment discrimination. 163 The principal disagreement in the
debate once centered on Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry: Could
litigants slice an issue from the litigation’s constellation of questions and
conduct a predominance inquiry as to only that issue, or must a judge
first decide that common questions predominate over individual ones
such that Rule 23(c)(4) becomes a housekeeping tool to manage what is
already a manageable class? For a while the Fifth Circuit consistently
adhered to the latter view, 164 but recently changed course in In re Deep158

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
As the Rule 23 subcommittee contemplates changes to the Rule, this suggests that no
changes are needed to Rule 23(c)(4), but might be appropriate as to “ascertainability.”
160
In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 806–07, 816 (5th Cir. 2014).
161
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2013).
162
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
163
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th
Cir. 2012).
164
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745–46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The proper
interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a
housekeeping rule . . . .”); see also Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action EndRun, 52 Emory L.J. 709, 748 (2003) (arguing that Rule 23 “never intended . . . to authorize
expansive issue class actions”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Cli159
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water Horizon. 165 The First, 166 Second, 167 Third, 168 Fourth, 169 Sixth, 170
Seventh, 171 Ninth, 172 and Eleventh 173 Circuits have each taken various
approaches that facilitate issue classes to different degrees. Perhaps due

ent, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 955 (1998) (noting that the predominance requirement “has
generally been understood (and I think correctly) to override the possibility of certification
of a class on particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) unless those issues are found to ‘predominate’ over the individual ones in the case”).
165
Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 806 (observing that the district court had planned to
sever liability from damage issues and try them separately, noting that plan accorded “with
this court’s previous case law and Rule 23(c)(4),” and favorably citing Butler, 727 F.3d at
800 (“[A] class action limited to determining liability on a class-wide basis, with separate
hearings to determine—if liability is established—the damages of individual class members,
or homogeneous groups of class members, is permitted by Rule 23(c)(4) and will often be
the sensible way to proceed.”)).
166
The First Circuit has not said explicitly how it would evaluate the predominance inquiry within issue classes but has noted that “even if individualized determinations were
necessary to calculate damages, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) would still allow the court to maintain the
class action with respect to other issues.” Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 41
(1st Cir. 2003).
167
In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] court
may employ subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of whether the claim
as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”).
168
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the approach
advocated by the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation and suggesting that trial
courts consider a series of factors).
169
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2003) (“According
to the dissent, a district court must first ‘determine that’ an entire lawsuit ‘as [a]
whole’ . . . satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements imposed by 23(b)(3) and
only if the entire lawsuit does satisfy these requirements may a court ‘manage[ ] through orders authorized by 23(c).’ The dissent’s argument finds no support in the law—not in Rule
23 itself nor in any case or treatise.”).
170
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860–61
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘when adjudication of questions of liability common to the class
will achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate’[,]” mentioning the availability of
Rules 23(c)(4) and (c)(5), and concluding that certifying a liability class would further economies of scale and make a negative-value consumer class possible) (quoting Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1437 (2013)).
171
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2012); Mejdrech v.
Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2003).
172
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996).
173
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (permitting
hybrid class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(c)(4)); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d
1241, 1258–59, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (conducting the predominance inquiry as to the RICO
claim and certifying that claim but not a claim for breach of contract).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Constructing Issue Classes

1893

to this emerging consensus, the Supreme Court has declined multiple
opportunities to weigh in. 174
In 2010, the American Law Institute approved the Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, which sets forth a workable view of predominance that considerably eases the presumed friction between Rule
23(b)(3) and (c)(4). Richard Nagareda, the principal author of that section, suggested that courts should certify issue classes where resolving
the issue would “materially advance the resolution of multiple civil
claims by addressing the core of the dispute in a manner superior to other realistic procedural alternatives, so as to generate significant judicial
efficiencies.” 175 Accordingly, courts should certify classes even if aggregate treatment as to just one issue materially resolves class members’
claims. 176 The superiority requirement is embedded in both the “materially advance” language and, more obviously, as a condition that certifying the issue would be “superior to other realistic alternatives” such that
it “generate[s] significant judicial efficiencies.” 177
Oftentimes in collective litigation, resolving a core question—
typically one that centers on the defendant’s conduct—can have a domino effect on all the cases. When that occurs, certifying the issue materially advances litigants’ claims. Consider a nonclass example such as a
basic bus accident. Regardless of whether the bus contains two or eighty
passengers, resolving fundamental questions over driver negligence or
product malfunction removes eligibility components and advances the
litigation; it prevents disparate questions over each passenger’s damages
174

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013) (remanding for further consideration in light of Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1426).
175
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02(a)(1); see also
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring issue classes
to “materially advance the litigation”); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472–
73 (5th Cir. 1986) (“It is difficult to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions
[regarding the state-of-the-art defense] will not significantly advance the resolution of the
underlying hundreds of cases.”); Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.24 (4th ed. 2004)
(suggesting that aggregate treatment should “materially advance[] the disposition of the litigation as a whole”). Using this standard avoids what David Rosenberg has characterized as
the “myopia of proceduralist analysis” by “reorient[ing] discussion towards a tort-policy perspective.” David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210, 214 (1996).
176
See Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to
Regulating Class Actions, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 995, 1005 (2005) (“[I]t is the lack of substantial
dissimilarity that makes class actions a fair and procedurally viable means of rendering
judgment for or against the class and its members.”).
177
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02(a)(1).
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from undermining the judge’s ability to adjudicate a core question. Otherwise, judges around the country would hear the same evidence many
times—risking conflicting opinions as to the same conduct and undermining judicial efficiency. When adjudicating a common issue significantly advances the litigation, it is ripe for issue certification. 178 Thus,
some courts have properly separated eligibility components such as
plaintiffs’ specific and proximate causation, 179 reliance, and damages180
to facilitate issue classes in employment-discrimination, 181 environmental-contamination, 182 and consumer-fraud litigation. 183

178

Id. See generally In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (“[W]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and
they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.”
(quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998))); Galvan v. KDI
Distrib., Inc., No. SACV 08-0999-JVS (ANX), 2011 WL 5116585, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2011) (“[I]n general, predominance is met when there exists generalized evidence which
proves or disproves an [issue or] element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such
proof obviates the need to examine each class members’ individual position.” (quoting In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002))).
179
E.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ut proximate
cause is an individual issue and will not be addressed by the class jury. . . . Issues of causation and damages issues, such as whether that defect caused the damage to a particular window and how much the design contributed to the rot, will be handled individually.”); De
Gidio v. Perpich, 612 F. Supp. 1383, 1386–87 (D. Minn. 1985) (“Accordingly, under Rule
23(c)(4)(A), the court will confine the class action to those issues pertaining to the alleged
constitutional violation and injunctive relief. Thus individuals will be required to present evidence of causation and their particular damages separately.”).
180
E.g., Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The individuation of damages in consumer class actions is rarely determinative under Rule 23(b)(3).
Where, as here, common questions predominate regarding liability, then courts generally
find the predominance requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues remain.”); Nieberding v. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 600, 618 (D. Kan. 2014)
(certifying liability issues for class treatment but reserving the damages issue for a later date
if plaintiffs prevail on liability); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 292
F.R.D. 652, 674–75 (D. Kan. 2013) (certifying an issue class and noting that “[d]etermining
each class members’ damages, if any, may require individualized determinations”); Ellis v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (addressing damages separately from the issue of certification).
181
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th
Cir. 2012); Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004).
182
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003).
183
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 861
(6th Cir. 2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2013); Pella
Corp., 606 F.3d at 395.
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But moving from a basic bus accident—even with an alleged product
defect—to manufacturing a defective product such as a drug or medical
device that causes “downstream” injuries 184 shifts courts’ certification
calculus dramatically when plaintiffs hope to certify general causation.
Courts have certified conduct-related defenses to general causation such
as the military contractor defense in the Agent Orange litigation and the
state-of-the-art defense in asbestos, 185 yet they tend to eschew issueclass treatment on general causation. 186 Nevertheless, a similar trifurcated trial (with general causation tried first) saved substantial time in over
600 consolidated Bendectin cases. 187
Although general causation focuses on the defendant’s conduct, there
is a persistent stigma that certification cannot materially advance the
claims’ resolution because courts must still determine eligibility components, such as specific causation and damages. 188 Yet, when the Fifth
Circuit upheld the decision to certify the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos, it concluded:
It is difficult to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions
will not significantly advance the resolution of the underlying hundreds of cases. . . . Judge Parker’s plan is clearly superior to the alternative of repeating, hundreds of times over, the litigation of the state
of the art issues with, as that experienced judge says, “days of the
same witnesses, exhibits and issues from trial to trial.” 189

This logic holds in more recent mass-tort cases.
In the Vioxx litigation, for example, Judge Eldon Fallon conceded
that Merck’s conduct components were uniform: “[C]ommon questions
of fact exist regarding the development, manufacturing, and testing of
Vioxx” as well as “Vioxx’s effects on the human body.” 190 But, citing
184

Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02 cmt. a.
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472–473 (5th Cir. 1986) (“It is difficult
to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions [regarding the state-of-the-art defense] will not significantly advance the resolution of the underlying hundreds of cases.”).
186
See, e.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 205 (D. Minn. 2003) (“While
these claims involve common issues, they also involve individual issues such as injury, causation, the learned intermediary doctrine and comparative fault.”).
187
In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 293–94 (6th Cir. 1988); see also infra notes 233–
38 and accompanying text (discussing Bendectin and the potential benefits to defendants).
188
Accuracy presents a competing concern in product liability cases, which is addressed in
Subsection III.B.3.
189
Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472–73.
190
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 2006).
185
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the Fifth Circuit’s now outdated predominance test, diverse substantive
laws, and the need to resolve eligibility components such as specific
causation and damages, he denied certification. 191
Yet, had Judge Fallon been open to grouping similar state laws or if
state law had been functionally equivalent, resolving general causation
in an issue class might have materially advanced the claims’ resolution:
Merck’s deceptive marketing practices and scientific misconduct were
central issues in each trial—so much so that Judge Carol Higbee bifurcated New Jersey test cases along those lines. 192 The first phase addressed common conduct issues such as whether Merck failed to warn
patients that Vioxx posed cardiovascular risks, and the second phase addressed eligibility components like specific causation. 193 Thus, solving
choice-of-law problems or determining whether state laws on conduct
components were similar might tee up a defendant’s conduct for issue
class certification. Limited certification might also prove superior to
nonclass alternatives, which in Vioxx meant incorporating coercive provisions to rope as many plaintiffs as possible into the settlement. 194 Accordingly, even in mass torts, courts should consider certifying conductrelated components. 195
Requiring that issue classes materially advance the cases’ resolution
incorporates a pragmatic backstop that serves to limit even conduct
components. Adjudicating a defendant’s conduct collectively is beneficial only when conduct is uniform—even if it affects plaintiffs dissimilarly. For example, in Klay v. Humana, Inc., the defendants “utilized
many different form contracts” and “contracted with different types of
care-providing entities.” 196 Thus, even though “[a] breach is a breach is a
breach,” 197 a defendant’s contractual obligations differed in ways that
made certifying conduct components impossible.

191

Id. at 462–63.
Snigdh Prakesh, All the Justice Money Can Buy 24–35 (2011). But see generally Roger
H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 79 (contending that “[m]ass trials on the issue of ‘general’ causation create substantial savings only
when plaintiffs lose because this leads immediately to the dismissal of large numbers of
mass tort claims”).
193
Prakesh, supra note 192, at 24–35.
194
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. La. 2009).
195
Campos, supra note 88, at 1068–69, 1072.
196
382 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008).
197
Id. at 1263.
192
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2. Choice of Law
When state law governs a defendant’s conduct, choice-of-law questions can complicate issue classes. Nevertheless, the need for state law
alone should not signal that issue classes are inappropriate. There are
several circumstances in which choosing the applicable law need not
pose a barrier.
First, as in some contractual warranty cases, a single state’s law may
apply across the board. 198 Second, certain forum states’ choice-of-law
rules may dictate that one state’s law should apply to the entire class.
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied Michigan law to a
nationwide breach-of-warranty class action against DaimlerChrysler because the defendant made its “decisions concerning the design, manufacture, and distribution” there and “Michigan is the only state where conduct relevant to all class members occurred.” 199 Third, the substantive
law may not vary from state to state, and thus may create no conflict. 200
When this is the case, the forum can apply a single law to all class members, and typically selects its own state law. 201
198
See, e.g., In re Detwiler, 305 F. App’x 353, 355 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying a contractual
choice-of-law provision specifying that Florida law must govern); Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(1).
199
Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 626 (Okla. 2003); see also Int’l Union
of Operating Eng’rs v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-3015-03, 2005 WL 2205341, at *1, *5
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 29, 2005) (certifying a nationwide class of third-party payors
in the Vioxx litigation by applying New Jersey law). Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., a federal court sitting in Oklahoma would have to apply Oklahoma’s
choice-of-law provision, suggesting that the same outcome could result in federal court. 313
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Of course, a defendant’s principal place of business emerges as a
common feature only by virtue of the class device; in individual litigation, it would stand out
no more than where the plaintiff purchased the car. Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in
Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 661, 673 (2005).
200
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(2); see, e.g., In
re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As courts have
noted, state contract law defines breach consistently such that the question will usually be
the same in all jurisdictions.”); Klay, 382 F.3d at 1263 (“A breach is a breach is a
breach . . . .”); accord Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 n.8 (1995) (“[C]ontract
law is not at its core ‘diverse, nonuniform, and confusing.’”); In re Digitek Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:08-md-01968, 2010 WL 2102330, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 25, 2010) (“Step one
[of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] involves analyzing if ‘an actual conflict
exists . . . .’ If no conflict exists, then I can just apply a single set of laws to the entire class’
claims.”).
201
In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46, 56 (D.N.J. 2009), opinion clarified by 267 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.N.J. 2010), opinion modified on reconsideration by
No. 07-2720 (DRD), 2010 WL 2976496, at *15–16 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010) (applying New
Jersey’s choice-of-law rules to a consumer fraud class and deciding that New Jersey law
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Even when state laws vary, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be able to place
them into a few categories such that an issue class could adjudicate
common conduct components across a particular group. 202 As one noted
conflicts scholar explained, “while in theory all fifty states could have
different laws, in practice there are seldom more than two or three rules
on any given question, each adopted by many states.” 203 And those differences principally arise with regard to eligibility components. In product liability laws, for example, states differ most over comparative fault
and statutes of limitation, 204 not a defendant’s conduct. 205 Even though
would apply because it had the greatest interest). While a general presumption in favor of
applying forum law exists, state courts have split over whether that presumption applies in
class actions. Compare Ferrell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 P.3d 1156, 1163–64 (N.M. 2008) (“If
the defendant fails to bring any ‘clearly established contradictory law’ to the court’s attention, the district court cannot be faulted if it concludes that the laws of the jurisdictions . . . do not conflict such that a single state’s law may be applied to the entire class.”),
and Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1081–82 (Cal. 2001) (presuming that
forum law should apply), with Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672
(Tex. 2004) (conflating the choice-of-law burden with plaintiffs’ certification burden), and
Dragon v. Vanguard Indus., 89 P.3d 908, 918 (Kan. 2004) (requiring the class proponent to
show that there are no significant differences in states’ law).
202
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(3); see, e.g.,
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (certifying “six state subclasses
demonstrates that the district court carefully considered how the case would proceed, explicitly finding that the consumer protection acts of these six states have nearly identical elements”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998)
(expressing a willingness “to certify nationwide classes on the ground that relatively minor
differences in state law could be overcome at trial by grouping similar state laws together
and applying them as a unit”); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998–1000 (3d Cir.
1986) (certifying nationwide classes with four subgroups based on state law differences); see
also Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2012) (expressing no view
on whether remanded consumer protection claims could be grouped into smaller classes).
203
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments,
39 Am. J. Comp. L. 465, 475 (1991).
204
Statutes of limitations vary based on length, tolling periods, injuries suffered, and types
of claim. E.g., La. Civil Code Ann. art. 3492 (2014) (tolling one year from the date of injury); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2014) (allowing five years for claims involving personal
injury or property damage). And states differ substantially on how a plaintiff’s fault affects
recovery. Compare Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 75 So. 3d 624, 645 (Ala. 2011) (barring
recovery for plaintiffs who are contributorily negligent), with Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc.,
816 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Alaska 1991) (using comparative fault for products liability), Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-817 to -823 (LexisNexis 2014) (same), and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55216 (2014) (using modified comparative fault that allows plaintiffs to recover so long as
fault is less than fifty percent).
205
When determining whether a defendant created a defective product, most states have
adopted either a consumer-expectancy test or risk-benefit analysis, with some states adopting
both as potential ways to prove a product defect. Even states that have adopted a single
method take the other method into account. See, e.g., Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723
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this approach can pose the most hurdles in terms of collecting and clustering statutes, common law, and jury instructions, that undertaking becomes part of plaintiffs’ burden only once the court concludes that the
forum state’s law differs from other states’ laws (as opposed to a “false
conflict”). 206 Only then does the party seeking to certify a class have the
burden of proving that states’ laws fall into limited patterns that courts
can adjudicate collectively. 207 As the next Subsection explains, crafting
an adjudication plan could aid parties in meeting this burden.
3. “Ascertainability” and Precision
Issue classes further aggregation’s goals of enforcing substantive
rights, promoting efficiency, ensuring finality, and encouraging accuracy
and consistency through issue preclusion. 208 Although preclusion doctrines vary by state, most explain that where the first lawsuit actually litigates and determines the same issue with a valid, final judgment, that
suit prevents subsequent cases from relitigating the issue so long as it
was essential to the first judgment. 209 Some states add a mutuality component, which requires subsequent suits to involve the same parties or
their privies as the first one. 210 But most states permit nonmutual issue
So. 2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1998) (applying a risk-utility test while considering consumer expectations); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a
modified consumer-expectations test that also considers the product’s risk and the feasibility
of an alternative design). Only a few states have chosen one test while rejecting the other as
a factor to consider. See, e.g., Agrofollajes, S.A. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 48
So. 3d 976, 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (adopting a risk-utility test); Rahmig v. Mosley
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 69–70 (Neb. 1987) (using the consumer-expectations test); Sims
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 365 (Wyo. 1988) (adopting the consumer-expectations
test).
206
The Constitution permits courts to presume that their forum law applies in deciding
whether the forum state’s law differs from those of other states with a connection to the
plaintiffs’ claim. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
207
Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits
Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 799, 811;
Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 Tul. L.
Rev. 1723, 1741 (2006).
208
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 1.03 (enumerating
aggregation goals).
209
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
210
States requiring mutuality include Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia. Steven P. Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair
Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damages Limits, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1459,
1468 n.60 (2009) (citing cases); see, e.g., Sosebee v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 701 F.3d 1012, 1026
(5th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike the federal issue preclusion rules, Louisiana still requires mutuality
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preclusion so long as it comports with due process requirements. 211 Consequently, when courts certify issue classes, they must: (1) specify precisely which issues are certified, litigated, and determined; and (2) in diversity cases governed by state law, define the class members with care
so that states with mutuality requirements can readily assess whether the
plaintiff was “in privity with” the class representative in the first suit.
Beginning with the first concern over specificity, creating an adjudication plan that contemplates Daubert motions, summary judgment motions, and special verdict forms 212 can benefit both certifying courts and
subsequent courts faced with preclusion questions. 213 If the initial parties
have trouble delineating the issue or issues to be certified, that serves as
a substantial warning sign that certification is inappropriate. Conversely,
adjudication plans that concretely demonstrate how aggregate treatment
materially resolves the claims can enhance the credibility of class certification motions. 214 And, even though courts cannot predetermine the res

for issue preclusion.”); State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 640 (Miss. 1991) (“A
final decision of an issue on its merits is normally thought preclusive only if there is an identity of parties from one suit to the next, and of their capacities as well. Privity, succession in
interest, and relationship are terms used to express these identities.”).
211
See Nonkes, supra note 210, at 1467–68 (“Today, most states have abandoned mutuality for both defensive and offensive applications of collateral estoppel. A sizeable minority,
however, retain the traditional mutuality requirement. Still others allow only defensive use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel.”). States that do not require mutuality for offensive or defensive issue preclusion include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1467 n.59 (citing cases from
each jurisdiction). Kentucky and Massachusetts allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.
Moore v. Commonwealth of Ky., Cabinet for Human Res., 954 S.W.2d 317, 318–19 (Ky.
1997); Coastal Oil New Eng., Inc. v. Citizens Fuels Corp., 769 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2002). Finally, states permitting only defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion include Ohio, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Nonkes, supra note
210, at 1468 n.61 (citing cases). Federal courts assessing federal causes of action do not require mutuality for offensive or defensive issue preclusion. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion); BlonderTongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (permitting defensive
nonmutual issue preclusion).
212
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)(2) (requiring courts to instruct and explain issues to the jury).
213
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.12.
214
See, e.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs point
out that they submitted a sample trial plan with a comparative legal analysis of each subclass
state, suggestions of how the case could be tried in phases, and a statement of class structure
and remedies.”).
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judicata effect of their own judgments, 215 forcing parties to contemplate
the certified issue from a “same issue” 216 standpoint can sharpen their
focus and help them unravel certification’s practical consequences on
subsequent cases. 217
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. 218 provides a textbook example of the
perils of imprecision: The Florida Supreme Court decertified a classwide trial that awarded $145 billion in punitive damages to Florida
smokers, but allowed some of the jury’s factual determinations to stand
so that class members could avoid relitigating those issues in individual
trials. 219 But the initial trial court never intended to conduct an issue
class, so the class-wide findings were imprecise. In Engle’s aftermath,
the parties fought vigorously over what the jury had actually determined. 220 Consequently, courts certifying issue classes should take great

215
Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(“Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as defined,
subdivision (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court conducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can be tested only in a
subsequent action.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), advisory committee’s note)).
216
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. c (1982) (listing factors to consider in
deciding whether an issue is the same).
217
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.12 cmt. b. This eases
the court’s subsequent obligation under Rule 23(c)(1)(B), which requires the court to define
the “class and the class claims, issues, or defenses” (emphasis added). Rule 23(c)(1)(B)
“means that the text of the order or an incorporated opinion must include (1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to be
certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.” Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 185,
187–88 (3d Cir. 2006). In Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., the Third Circuit specified that its
interpretation in Wachtel applied to issue classes. 655 F.3d 255, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2011). The
Third Circuit’s test has gained traction in other circuits. E.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667
F.3d 900, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013); In re
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 38–41 (1st Cir. 2009); Gregurek v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. CV 05-6067-GHK (FMOx), 2009 WL 4723137, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009).
218
945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
219
Id. at 1269.
220
Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2010). The
U.S. Supreme Court has denied several petitions from R.J. Reynolds to consider whether affording issue preclusive effect violated the Due Process Clause. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. Clay, 133 S. Ct. 650 (2012) (denying certiorari); Martina S. Barash, Supreme Court Again
Takes a Pass on Reviewing Engle’s Preclusive Effect, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 1
(June 13, 2014) (“Tobacco companies failed for the ninth time June 9 to get the U.S. Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of reusing jury findings from a decertified Florida tobacco class action in individual suits.”). The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its deci-
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care to explain their summary judgment opinions and craft special verdict forms to minimize preclusion challenges.
As to the second concern, if a subsequent court requires mutuality, it
must be able to easily determine who was a class member and is thus entitled to assert issue preclusion. To identify the class and meet standing
requirements, plaintiffs’ lawyers have defined members in terms of people harmed by the defendant’s conduct, employed subjective and objective criteria, and invoked criteria dependent on the merits. 221
But these myriad approaches have prompted frequent objections and
some circuits have allowed defendants to turn this straightforward assessment into an impossibly high “ascertainability” standard. 222 For example, defendants invoke the lack of “ascertainability” as a rationale
against certifying small-claims consumer classes whose members are inherently difficult to identify. 223 Other objections are the converse of one
another: the class is overly broad because it includes both injured and
uninjured members, 224 or the class is a “fail-safe” class based on the defendant’s wrongdoing because it requires establishing liability before determining membership. 225
sion to allow issue preclusion in Engle progeny cases in 2013. Philip Morris USA v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 428 (Fla. 2013).
221
Plaintiffs’ attorneys often revise their class definition after receiving class discovery
from defendants, and should be given latitude to do so. But see John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire &
Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Where it is facially apparent from the pleadings that there is no ascertainable class, a district court may dismiss the class allegation on
the pleadings.”); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2008 WL 4681368, at *10
(E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that lack of ascertainability “alone is sufficient to warrant
striking the Plaintiffs’ class allegations on the pleadings”).
222
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order that certifies a class action must define the
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses . . . . ”).
223
Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 305, 308 (2010).
224
E.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Brief in
Opposition of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 1, Whirlpool Corp. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277
(2014) (Nos. 13-430, 13-431) (“The questions presented turn on the assertion that ‘most
members have never experienced the alleged defect,’ and that, accordingly, painstaking individual inquiries would doom any class resolution of these cases.”).
225
For more information on fail-safe classes, compare John Beisner et al., Ascertainability:
Reading Between the Lines of Rule 23, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 253 (Mar. 25, 2011)
(arguing in favor of ascertainability challenges and against the viability of fail-safe classes),
and Erin L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class As an Independent Bar to Class Certification,
81 Fordham L. Rev. 2769, 2769 (2013) (suggesting fail-safe classes should not be certified),
with Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“If class actions could be
defeated because membership was difficult to ascertain at the class certification stage, ‘there
would be no such thing as a consumer class action.’”), and Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA,
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The basic premise behind each of these objections is the same—at
some point, class definitions will turn on plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief.
The more harm-based definitions incorporate subjective eligibility components, the more difficult certification becomes. For instance, the medical monitoring class in the failed Castano litigation included “all nicotine dependent persons in the United States,” 226 whereas the Donovan
class successfully defined members as those with lung cancer who had a
twenty pack-year smoking history. 227 While both rely on plaintiffs’ eligibility, nicotine dependence entails a subjective inquiry; evidence of
smoking history and a lung-cancer diagnosis does not.
Considering the class definition as an extension of conduct-related
components and eligibility components could alleviate some of the
premature “ascertainability” objections when a class is certified only as
to conduct issues. What defendants cast as an unascertainable class is often a function of injecting eligibility components into the class definition
and improperly commingling standing requirements with predominance
concerns. 228 Thus, certifying an issue class based on a defendant’s conduct and defining members as those harmed by that conduct should be
permissible so long as eligibility components become objectively verifiable or subject to a cy pres remedy in subsequent proceedings. 229 For example, had the Donovan court not certified a plenary tobacco class, invoking preclusion on conduct issues in follow-on proceedings would
have been straightforward: Produce an affidavit as to a plaintiff’s number of pack-years and a lung-cancer diagnosis. If the certifying court is
the same one trying follow-on proceedings, then the judge will be able

287 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same), and Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the
Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2359 (2014) (suggesting that
not accepting fail-safe classes would eviscerate consumer class actions).
226
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1996).
227
Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, 268 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Class members can
sign affidavits under penalty of perjury or submit doctors’ letters to detail their smoking histories and medical status.”).
228
E.g., Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 429–31 (6th Cir. 2009)
(denying class certification in part because determining who was in the class would require
“individualized fact-finding”); see also In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389,
397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]lass membership is not feasibly ascertainable where it hinges on
myriad medical factors individual to each class member.”).
229
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.07(c) (suggesting
that when courts find that individual distributions to class members are not possible, parties
should “identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by
the class”).
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to identify class members later, which is all that courts should require.230
In multidistrict litigation, however, transferee judges should take special
care to ensure that class members are objectively identifiable so that
transferor judges can easily assess who is entitled to assert the issue
class’s preclusive effect on remand.
B. The Myth of Jackpot Justice
Issue classes are controversial for both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys. 231 Although they are often thought to benefit plaintiffs by “blackmailing” defendants into settling, in practice, issue classes are doubleedged swords. Even when a defendant brings all its resources to bear on
summary judgment motions or bellwether trials, that strategy works only
by dissuading plaintiffs’ attorneys to abandon their clients’ claims; it
does nothing to systematically prevent further suits. 232 But an issue class
gives the defendant a rare opportunity to stymie further claims through
preclusion—something nonclass litigation cannot do. 233
If the defendant is confident that it has done nothing wrong or that the
plaintiffs’ evidence on conduct is weak, an issue class can undercut
230
See, e.g., Bush v. Calloway Consol. Grp. River City, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-841-J-37MCR,
2012 WL 1016871, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Class members need not actually be
ascertained prior to certification, but each individual’s class membership must be ascertainable at some stage in the proceeding.”); Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 280 F.R.D.
408, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“It is enough that the class be ascertainable . . . . [Class members
who threw gift cards away] will be required to submit an appropriate affidavit, which can be
evaluated during the claims administration process if [plaintiff] prevails at trial.”); Spagnola
v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“While class members need not actually be ascertained prior to certification, they must be ascertainable at some stage of the proceeding.”); Mazur v. eBay Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same); Newberg on
Class Actions § 3.3 (5th ed. 2014) (“[T]he court need not know the identity of each class
member before certification; ascertainability requires only that the court be able to identify
class members at some stage of the proceeding.”). But see Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 725
F.3d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]lass certification will founder if the only proof of class
membership is the say-so of putative class members or if ascertaining the class requires extensive and individualized fact-finding.”).
231
Because of this, commentators have been skeptical about issue classes’ utility. See, e.g.,
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Beisner, Cabraser Weigh Comcast’s Impact; Flesh Out Typicality,
Rise of Ascertainability, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 520 (May 9, 2014) (“Beisner said
Rule 23(c)(4) won’t be used much because it basically has class proponents going through
the expensive process of trial, and perhaps getting a liability determination, but there is no
compensation for class members at the end.”).
232
See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008) (disapproving preclusion through virtual representation).
233
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
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thousands of absent plaintiffs’ cases in a single trial just as bifurcating
liability does in mass joinder. 234 In the Bendectin litigation, for instance,
the court used a trifurcated trial to test general causation first. 235 When
jurors found for the defendant, they extinguished 1,100 plaintiffs’ cases
in a single twenty-two-day trial. 236 Issue classes can also prevent defeats
in unusually sympathetic plaintiffs’ cases from precluding relitigation
across the board. 237 The danger, however, is that issue classes eliminate
outcome variability and increase the number of claims brought into the
system, thereby leading to so-called “jackpot justice.” 238
The issue class is controversial for plaintiffs’ attorneys, too, because it
vests initial litigation control in the hands of a few attorneys and, even
following a win, class counsel may face additional hurdles before receiving fees. Still, by designating class counsel, courts delineate a property right in the ultimate recovery in a way that nonclass, multidistrict
litigation does not. 239 Plus, Rule 23 requires judges to make specific
findings regarding adequate representation, which has not occurred
when appointing lead lawyers in multidistrict litigation. 240 Nevertheless,
when damages are substantial, the issue class has the potential to foreclose subsequent litigation and wrest lucrative fees from nonclass counsel. The following subsections consider these controversies, propose a
method for addressing attorneys’ fees, and urge courts to make interlocutory appeals on the merits available after trying an issue class.
1. Incentivizing Issue Classes with Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs’ attorneys create and fund class actions. Thus, invigorating
issue classes requires incentivizing the plaintiffs’ bar. And, as is true for
most attorneys, money motivates. But issue classes are uniquely situated
234

A recent and rare issue class action trial took place in Ohio over moldy washing machines; the defendants won, precluding Ohio residents from relitigating the question. Perry
Cooper, Ohio Moldy Washer Verdict Goes to Whirlpool; Class Will Pursue Claims in Other
States, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Nov. 14, 2014).
235
In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988).
236
Id. at 293.
237
Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 499, 535 (1998).
238
E.g., Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 (2007).
239
See generally Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of
Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1919, 1930 (2000) (“The presence of
multiple competing attorneys creates the lack of a clear property right in recovery.”).
240
Burch, supra note 1, at 88.
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because they do not immediately produce a common fund from which
successful class counsel can recover.
In plenary classes, restitution theories justify class counsel’s fee: A
class member who benefits from a class settlement will be unjustly enriched at counsel’s expense unless counsel receives a reasonable fee. 241
Similarly, in issue classes, counsel confers a substantial benefit on class
members by successfully advancing the litigation. 242 But there’s a
catch—the common-fund doctrine typically requires a fund that “consists of money or other property” before class members are required to
contribute to the attorney’s costs of securing that fund. 243
For many issue classes, establishing a common fund after a successful
class-wide trial on the defendant’s conduct will be a nonissue. Once they
survive dispositive motions and become certified classes, many will settle collectively in the same court and thereby create a common fund. 244

241
See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“The common-fund doctrine
reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity . . . and it stands as a well-recognized exception to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney’s fees.”);
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29 cmt. c (2011) (“Class counsel assumes for this purpose the role of restitution claimant; the restitution claim is asserted
by the counsel against the class. Counsel asserts that the class will be unjustly enriched, at
counsel’s expense, unless a reasonable fee is awarded from the common fund.”); Charles
Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 656,
663–66 (1991).
242
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. c (“The lawyers in the aggregate proceeding will have conferred a substantial benefit on claimants insofar as that preclusive effect, in a given instance, inures to their advantage in other proceedings.”).
243
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29(1) cmt. a (2011); Alan
Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee
Litigation 61 (2d ed. 2005). There have been cases where the attorney’s efforts did not bring
the fund into creation, but preserved or enhanced the fund, reapportioned or distributed the
fund, or even forced the defendant to take remedial action that moots the litigation. See, e.g.,
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (allowing a successful plaintiff
who only indirectly established others’ rights to a trust fund to recover fees); Koppel v.
Wien, 743 F.2d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (permitting fees even where “no judgment or consent decree was entered and the complaint was dismissed as moot”); Reiser v. Del Monte
Props. Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that fees are still possible even
where a defendant voluntarily acts in a way that favors plaintiff but moots the suit); Abbott,
Puller & Myers v. Peyser, 124 F.2d 524, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (declining to apply the common fund doctrine to the case because the plaintiff did not “create, enhance, preserve, or protect [a] fund”).
244
As Section II.C discussed, however, a subsequent settlement class would require a separate certification analysis.
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Common funds have materialized in high-profile issue class successes
and failures such as Engle and the blood products litigation. 245
In the original Engle litigation, tobacco company defendants could
not afford to post a traditional bond to appeal the $145 billion class
judgment against them, so class counsel negotiated a $600 million
“bond” that would be distributed to the class even if the appeal failed. 246
The Florida Supreme Court decertified the Engle class on appeal, but let
the class-wide trial’s issue-preclusive effect as to the companies’ conduct stand, which benefitted class members who pursued individual
claims. Once the judge decided to disburse the “bond” (which grew to
$800 million with interest), he awarded class attorneys $218 million in
fees for creating the fund and establishing “multiple findings to be given
res judicata effect in individually filed lawsuits,” 247 even though counsel
waived claims for additional fees from the preclusive effect of their
work. 248 Likewise, after the Seventh Circuit reversed issue certification
on the defendants’ negligence and breach of duty in the hemophiliacs’
HIV litigation against pharmaceutical companies, 249 the defendants negotiated a settlement class action that set aside $40 million for attorneys’
fees and costs. 250 Thus, when a common fund exists and the certifying
245

Infra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
Curt Anderson, Florida Smokers to Split $600M Tobacco Fund, Fla. Times-Union (Apr. 21,
2008, 12:30 PM), http://jacksonville.com/apnews/stories/042108/D906BNHO0.shtml; Douglas
Hanks, Anti-Tobacco Lawyers Awarded $218 Million Fee, Miami Herald, Apr. 17, 2008, at
1C (“An appeals court overturned the verdict, but not before tobacco companies put up about
$700 million to benefit class members even if the Rosenblatts lost the case.”); E-mail from
Stanley Rosenblatt, Howard Engle’s attorney, to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:33 PM EDT)
[hereinafter Rosenblatt E-mail] (on file with author).
247
Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008) (order
granting petition of class counsel for attorneys’ fees) (on file with author); see also Billy
Shields, Attorneys Awarded $218 Million for Work in Overturned Smokers’ Class Action
That Laid Groundwork for Other Suits, Daily Rep. (Apr. 16, 2008),
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=900005561391/Attorneys-Awarded-218-Million-forWork-in-Overturned-Smokers-Class-Action-That-Laid-Groundwork-for-OtherSuits?slreturn=20150825122511 (detailing the history and the process that led to the fee
award).
248
Rosenblatt E-mail, supra note 246 (“Our fee was paid from the guaranteed portion of
the appeal bonds and all class members received an allocation from the fund. We were urged
by trial lawyers to also take a percentage of the fees from lawyers benefitting from our work
through the binding findings. However, we waived any claims for additional fees.”).
249
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
250
Hensler et al., supra note 83, at 304–06. Dissatisfied with this amount, which was far
less than the $310 million they might have received based on their retainer agreements, several plaintiffs’ attorneys tried to enforce their contingent fees by asserting a lien on their clients’ settlement proceeds. In re Factor VII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d
246
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court retains jurisdiction over that fund, class attorneys’ fees can proceed conventionally. 251
There is, however, little to no precedent for awarding fees once counsel successfully litigates an issue class in multidistrict litigation and the
remaining issues must be remanded. 252 Even if remanded cases settle or
end in a favorable judgment, there may be no common fund. Multiple
attorneys compound the complications: While class counsel will have
contributed to the outcome with issue preclusion, a plaintiff may have a
different attorney who litigates her case in the transferor court, which
raises questions about fee splitting.
Nevertheless, one need not invent a theory out of whole cloth; charging liens and the common-benefit doctrine provide sound analogies for
fashioning a coherent path forward. In most states, charging liens permit
attorneys to assert liens against a client’s cause of action when they invest labor and resources into the client’s case and produce a successful
judgment or settlement. 253 The lien attaches upon filing the initial case
and accompanies the claim through judgment. Translated into the issueclass context, filing the class complaint (the cause of action) would trigger class counsel’s lien if counsel successfully litigated the issue, the is1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998). But Judge Grady, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, enjoined the
attorneys from asserting liens that contradicted and undermined the settlement agreement. Id.
at 1019.
251
See generally Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
that the common-fund doctrine is based on the idea that those who benefit from litigation
should share in its costs).
252
The Principles suggest that issue classes might “more closely approximate restitutionary principles” than the infamous “quasi-class action,” but noted that “best practices have yet
to crystallize in real-world practice.” Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra
note 42, § 2.09, reporter’s notes on cmt. c. Since that time, I have proposed best practices for
fee allocations in multidistrict litigation. Burch, supra note 1, at 118–23.
253
E.g., Froelich v. Graham, 80 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Ark. 2002); Sinclair, Louis, Siegel,
Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384–85 (Fla. 1983); In re
Estate of Estes, 731 S.E.2d 73, 74–75 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Consol. Constr. Servs., Inc. v.
Simpson, 813 A.2d 260, 275 (Md. 2002); Mahesh v. Mills, 602 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999); St. Cloud Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brutger, 488 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Musikoff v. Jay Parrino’s The Mint, LLC, 796 A.2d 866, 869–70 (N.J. 2002)
(“An attorney’s statutory lien attaches broadly to any verdict, report, decision, award, judgment or final order in his [or her] client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever
hands they may come.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Estate of Dresner v. State, 242
A.D.2d 627, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Rachel M. Kane, Attorneys at Law, 7 Am. Jur.
§ 318 (2d ed. 2014); 7A Rachel Kane et al., Corpus Juris Secondum § 446 (2014); 2 Robert
L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 12:13 (3d ed. 2014); cf. Rangel v. Save Mart, Inc., 142 P.3d 983,
989 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (permitting a charging lien when “an attorney makes significant
contributions to a case before being discharged”).
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sue class inured to the plaintiff’s benefit through preclusion, and that the
plaintiff ultimately received a favorable judgment or settlement
award. 254 The court conducting the follow-on proceedings could then
apportion fees to class counsel and individual counsel based on quantum-meruit principles. 255
Using charging liens to compensate issue-class counsel in multidistrict litigation can, however, present some limitations. First, when subsequent courts have jurisdiction to apportion fees, transferor judges may
be less familiar with class counsel’s effort and fees will lack uniformity. 256 Before remanding cases, transferee judges might quell this fear, in
part, by identifying likely fee-splitting scenarios and assigning fee percentages to those categories (settlement immediately upon remand versus a subsequent trial on eligibility components, for example). 257 Encompassing expected fees in an order triggers the law-of-the-case
doctrine, which suggests transferor judges should not revisit the question
absent changed circumstances—a possibility discussed more fully below. 258 Second, some states’ charging-lien statutes contain peculiarities
254
A constructive lien generally follows “the judgment into whatever form it may assume.” Froelich, 80 S.W.3d at 363; see also Trickett v. Laurita, 674 S.E.2d 218, 229 (W. Va.
2009) (noting that a charging lien “follows the proceeds, wherever they may be found”).
255
See, e.g., N. Pueblos Enters. v. Montgomery, 644 P.2d 1036, 1038 (N.M. 1982) (“Because a court exercises its equitable powers in enforcing an attorney’s charging lien, it may
inquire into the reasonableness of the asserted fee for purposes of enforcing the lien.”); People v. Keeffe, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1980) (“Generally, however, if an attorney is
discharged without cause he will be allowed a charging lien upon the proceeds of the lawsuit, the amount to be determined on a quantum meruit basis at the conclusion of the case.”);
infra notes 274–79 and accompanying text.
256
Some states attach charging liens only to the judgment. E.g., Howell v. Howell, 365
S.E.2d 181, 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“A charging lien is not available until there is a final
judgment or decree to which the lien can attach.”). But even if the lien attaches to the cause
of action, fees cannot be apportioned until the case concludes, which could happen in the
transferor court.
257
Transferee judges might also retain jurisdiction over fees if state substantive law permits the charging lien to attach to the cause of action. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
258
Infra notes 289–93 and accompanying text; see also In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d
406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law of the case doctrine and general principles of comity, a successor judge has the same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge,
but should not overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge
might have decided matters differently.” (quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885,
891 (5th Cir. 1982))); In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 443
(3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the transferee judge’s decision to vacate the transferor judge’s decision to compel arbitration because it violated the law of the case); David F. Herr, Multidistrict Litigation Manual § 10.17 (2015); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 175,
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like notifying the claimant about the lien in advance 259 or requiring contracts between the attorneys and clients. 260 Including lien information in
class notice might satisfy some states’ notice statutes, 261 but requiring
class attorneys to have a direct contractual relationship with class members could inhibit fee recovery from clients in a minority of states, such
as California. 262 Even in California, however, class attorneys can recover
contingent fees from a class member’s individual attorney on a quantum-meruit basis if the matter concludes successfully. 263
Liens are not the only possibility for recovering issue-class counsel’s
fees; the common-benefit doctrine complements the common-fund doctrine in cases where no common fund exists but plaintiffs’ attorneys confer a substantial benefit on the class, such as indivisible remedies. 264 In
these cases, the common-benefit doctrine permits attorneys’ fees when
the litigation confers “a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs
proportionately among them.” 265 Using this theory to compensate issueclass counsel raises three questions: (1) what constitutes a substantial
benefit; (2) how should fees be apportioned between class counsel and
individual counsel; and (3) to what extent can a transferee judge who
certifies an issue class retain jurisdiction to award counsel’s fees?
§ 20.133 (“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made by
the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, doing so in the
absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate the purposes of centralized
pretrial proceedings.”); Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1978) (same).
259
E.g., Thompson v. Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., 816 P.2d 532, 534–35 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991).
260
California is one such example. Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
532, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Because an attorney’s lien is not automatic and requires a
contract for its creation, a direct contractual relationship between the attorney and the client
is essential.”).
261
For notice to be timely, it generally must take place before the lawsuit ends in judgment
or settlement. Levine v. Gonzalez, 901 So. 2d 969, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
262
Carroll, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534–35.
263
Id.; Trimble v. Steinfeldt, 224 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
264
Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note 243, at 83–84; Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 975 F. Supp.
802, 806 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[A]n award of attorney’s fees and expenses under the common
benefit doctrine does not depend on the specific nature of the relief granted the plaintiff. Indeed, a fee award may be predicated on the grant of either monetary or equitable relief.”).
265
Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393–94 (1970); see also Allen, 975 F. Supp.
at 806 (citing Mills). For a discussion as to the ascertainability of the class, see supra Subsection III.A.3.
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First, courts have not reached a clear consensus as to what constitutes
a “substantial benefit,” 266 but analogous situations suggest that an issue
class’s preclusive effect would suffice. For example, when union members sue their union, courts have determined that plaintiffs benefit other
union members by establishing free speech rights 267 and incentivizing
unions to change their practices. 268 And, in Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, when a beneficiary litigated her rights against the defendant
bank’s trust, her success indirectly established the rights of fourteen other beneficiaries. 269 Although the other beneficiaries were not before the
Court, the Court nevertheless had the power to award fees. As the Supreme Court explained:
[W]hen such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit
of others, the formalities of the litigation—the absence of an avowed
class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than through a decree—hardly touch the power of equity in doing
justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation. 270

Comparatively, issue classes are less of a stretch. If plaintiffs’ attorneys
establish conduct components through an issue class and materially advance the class members’ claims, counsel has conferred a substantial,
issue-preclusive benefit. 271 Failing to compensate class attorneys when
plaintiffs cash in on that preclusive effect through a successful settlement or verdict would unjustly enrich plaintiffs at counsel’s expense.
Yet, the problem with the Sprague holding is obvious: Without appropriate boundaries on stare decisis as a substantial benefit, the doctrine
is limitless. How is a court to distinguish between compensable benefits
and positive externalities? If, for instance, several lawyers won sizeable
verdicts on their own in separate courts, the positive externalities from
those trials could spill over to other cases and prompt an aggregate settlement. But the beneficiaries would not pay for that externality. As the
restitutionary basis for class-action awards makes plain, “[C]lass counsel
266
The Principles do, however, reflect a consensus among American Law Institute members that issue-class lawyers “will have conferred a substantial benefit on claimants insofar
as that preclusive effect, in a given instance, inures to [claimants’] advantage in other proceedings.” Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. c.
267
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
268
Erkins v. Bryan, 785 F.2d 1538, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986).
269
307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939).
270
Id. at 167.
271
Romberg, supra note 8, at 333.
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may base a claim for fees only on the enhanced recovery obtained for a
class: the difference, in other words, between what the class received in
consequence of the lawyer’s intervention and what the class would have
received without it.” 272 Thus, differentiating compensable benefits from
noncompensable spillovers requires courts to distinguish class members
from the public as a whole (the ascertainability question covered previously 273), and fairly apportion fees between class counsel and individual
counsel.
The common-benefit doctrine is grounded in quantum meruit, which
should guide fee-apportionment decisions. 274 Quantum meruit, “how
much is merited,” compensates issue-class counsel for the benefit conferred on class members and, because not all class members (or their individual attorneys) may benefit equally, allows judges to tailor awards
accordingly. 275 Customizing the fair value of fee awards depends on
several factors: class counsel’s billing practices, work, and time spent; 276
class counsel’s opportunity costs and financial risk; 277 the value class
counsel conferred versus the amount of work the individual plaintiff’s
attorney contributed to the outcome; 278 and the plaintiff’s ultimate suc-

272

Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29 cmt. c (2011).
See supra Subsection III.A.3.
274
Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d
Cir. 1973) (“The award of fees under the equitable fund doctrine is analogous to an action in
quantum meruit . . . .”); 1 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards § 2:1 (3d ed. 2014); Burch, supra note 1, at 128–34.
275
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 39 cmt. B(ii) (2011); see
Black’s Law Dictionary 1361–62 (9th ed. 2009); Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action by Attorney to Recover Fees on Quantum Meruit Basis, 16 Causes of Action 85, § 3 (1988). Because
quantum meruit provides recovery only for the enhanced value to the class, if class counsel
represents some class members individually, then she can recover only for “time spent on
matters common to all claimants,” not for “time spent on developing or processing individual issues in any case for an individual client.” In re Guidant Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 05-1708 DWFAJB, 2006 WL 409229, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006).
276
See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974) (assessing time spent on a case); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 788 F.2d 830, 843–45 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining specific services
rendered); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (considering an attorney’s hourly billing rate); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 39 cmt. c (2000).
277
E.g., Richardson v. Parish of Jefferson, 727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 39 cmt. c (2000).
278
Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maint., 654 N.E.2d 675, 681–82 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Krohn, supra note 275, § 4. See generally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 39 cmt. c (2000) (“The standard rate or hourly fee might be modified by other
273

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Constructing Issue Classes

1913

cess. In fashioning these awards, judges should use the percentage
method and adjust the percentage upward or downward depending on
whether a case is remanded, if it subsequently goes to trial, if and when
it settles, the role various attorneys played in achieving that settlement,
and the overall cost-savings achieved through economies of scale. 279 Of
course, the judge must also ensure that the total contingent fee stays
within the limits of the applicable state’s law.
Tailoring issue-class counsel’s fee award raises the third issue: Can
transferee judges retain jurisdiction over counsel’s fee once the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“Panel”) remands cases to transferor
courts? 280 This is by far the most difficult hurdle. While precedent on
this point is limited, under the plain language of Title 28 of the United
State Code, Section 1407, transferee judges can suggest that the Panel
separate fees before remanding the rest of the case, which would allow
transferee judges to retain jurisdiction over the fee issue. 281 In practice,
the Panel has allowed transferee judges to continue to preside over
claims that benefit from uniform and consistent rulings, such as punitive
damages. 282 Although attorneys’ fees, like punitive damages, are not
stand-alone claims, courts have recognized that “the meaning of ‘claim’
is not so circumscribed” as to include only a cause of action, 283 which
suggests that transferee judges might retain jurisdiction over fee awards.

factors bearing on fairness, including success in the representation and whether the lawyer
assumed part of the risk of the client’s loss, as in a contingent-fee contract.”).
279
Burch, supra note 1, at 133.
280
Even if transferee judges cannot retain jurisdiction over fees, they can still issue a court
order that binds transferor judges through the law-of-the-case doctrine, and class counsel can
still assert a charging lien. See supra notes 253–63 and accompanying text.
281
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (allowing the Panel to “separate any claim” and “remand
any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded”).
282
E.g., In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the transferee judge
refused to remand to ensure “uniform and consistent application of detailed medical criteria”
to opt outs); In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 810 (3d Cir. 2000) (severing punitive damages); In
re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1999) (severing punitive damages); In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 9,
2014) (“When a case is remanded, it is the Court’s regular practice to sever any claims for
punitive or exemplary damages and retain jurisdiction over these claims in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.”).
283
Collins, 233 F.3d at 811 (permitting transferee judge to retain jurisdiction over punitive
damages and noting “a cause of action based upon negligence frequently is described as including ‘claims’ for property damage, lost wages, medical bills, and pain and suffering. Neither the statute’s language nor the snippets of legislative history cited to us provides a basis
for adopting the petitioners’ crabbed reading of the word”). If class attorneys are not com-
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On the other hand, allowing the transferee court to preside over fee issues after remand (and presumably post-trial) may run afoul of Section
1407 and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg,
Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach. 284 As Lexecon explains, a transferee
court’s authority is limited to “pretrial” proceedings and Section 1407
“obligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court
when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their course.” 285
Attorneys’ fees are post-resolution issues. Rule 23(h), which governs
class counsel’s fee, requires that counsel move for fees “no later than 14
days after the entry of judgment,” and that judges state their factual findings and legal conclusions in accordance with Rule 52(a). 286 While
transferee judges would be intimately familiar with class counsel’s effort, without a settlement before remand, they could not make precise
factual findings as to individual counsel’s subsequent post-remand efforts. 287 And while efficiency and public policy may counsel in favor of
allowing transferee judges to retain jurisdiction over fees, neither reason
proved persuasive in Lexecon. 288
Given these conflicting views, charting an appropriate course for
awarding issue-class counsel’s attorneys’ fees that incentivizes representation but likewise hews to important doctrinal considerations is no easy
feat. One compromise is to encourage transferee judges to issue interlocutory orders governing presumptive fee categories before remand. 289
As outlined above, judges could use quantum meruit principles to tailor
these categories to the circumstances and list factors for transferor judges to consider within each group. 290 Although transferee judges would

pensated for the benefit they conferred, they become the real parties in interest and own the
fee cause of action. Conte, supra note 274, § 3:8.
284
523 U.S. 26 (1998).
285
Id. at 34.
286
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); id. 54(d)(2).
287
Id. 52(a).
288
Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32.
289
Certifying courts have general authority to award fees under Rule 23(h). The Eighth
Circuit has also ruled that “[i]t is well established that courts can impose liability for courtappointed counsel’s fees on all plaintiffs benefitting from their services.” Walitalo v.
Iacocca, 968 F.2d 741, 747 (8th Cir. 1992).
290
Supra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. Judges might consider the incentives fees
create as illustrated by the Eighth Circuit in Walitalo, 968 F.2d at 748–49; see also Manual
for Complex Litigation, supra note 175, § 21.71 (“Compensating counsel for the actual benefits conferred on the class members is the basis for awarding attorney fees.”); Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.13 cmt. b (“[T]he percentage method

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Constructing Issue Classes

1915

lack both full information and jurisdiction to decide final fee awards,
there are strong rationales for embedding likely fee-splitting scenarios in
an interlocutory order. First, it lends some uniformity and predictability
to fees subsequently awarded in dispersed transferor courts. Second, it
provides some security for issue-class counsel who might be hesitant to
undertake the endeavor for fear their payday may never come. Encompassing expected fees in an interlocutory order triggers at least some
deference by transferor courts under the law-of-the-case doctrine, 291
clear error standards, 292 or comity. 293 These doctrines each suggest that
transferor judges should not revisit the fee question absent changed circumstances. 294 Finally, because issue-class counsel cannot control how
others handle the case on remand, this approach incentivizes class attorneys to inform and represent as many individual clients as possible. This
may make smaller claims more economical to litigate on remand,
prompt careful notice to class members, and ensure faithful counsel so
long as no structural conflicts exist among clients.
To be sure, permitting the transferee court to give interlocutory orders
pertaining to issue-class counsel’s fee does nothing to inhibit those outside the federal court’s jurisdiction (such as attorneys general litigating
in state courts) from invoking issue preclusion and thereby free riding on
class counsel’s efforts without cost. Accordingly, some have argued that
the transferee court’s jurisdiction over the mutual defendant—and hence
may not be feasible when the value of the common fund is difficult to assess. . . . In those
circumstances, the court should use the lodestar method.”).
291
E.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (using law of the case to
determine transferor court’s deference to transferee court’s orders); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 274–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Manual for Complex
Litigation, supra note 175, § 20.133 (suggesting that the transferor judge can vacate or modify rulings by the transferee judge subject to “law of the case” considerations, but that transferor courts should not do so absent a significant change in the circumstances because it
would frustrate the purpose of centralization).
292
E.g., Motorola Mobilty v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-C-6610, 2014 WL 258154, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014); Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1359 (N.D. Ga.
2013).
293
E.g., Guddeck ex rel. Guddeck v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 34 F. Supp. 3d 990, 997
(D. Minn. 2014) (suggesting that the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable to interlocutory
orders but nonetheless noting that “considerations of comity and judicial economy weigh
against disturbing [a transferor] court’s rulings” and applying a similar standard as In re
Ford Motor Corp., 591 F.3d at 410–11 (alteration in original) (quoting Fenner v. Wyeth, 912
F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (E.D. Mo. 2012))); Fenner, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 799–800 (internal quotation marks omitted) (refusing to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine but recognizing considerations of comity and judicial economy).
294
In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411; Weigel, supra note 258, at 577.
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the defendant’s assets—should act as a conduit to tax free riders. 295 But
this blurs the line between compensable benefits and noncompensable
spillover effects and raises federalism concerns by asserting jurisdiction
over plaintiffs and cases not properly before the court. As the Eighth
Circuit has recognized, transferee courts cannot levy fee assessments on
state-court plaintiffs via the defendant, for “[e]ven if the state plaintiffs’
attorneys participated in the MDL, the district court overseeing the
MDL does not have authority over separate disputes between state-court
plaintiffs and [the defendant].” 296 In short, thwarting some free riding is
not worth the cost to predictability or federalism.
2. Resource Parity, Outcome Equality, and Appellate Brakes
Ensuring mechanisms to award issue-class counsel’s fees incentivizes
issue classes and evens out the typical resource imbalance between a
single plaintiff and a corporate defendant. Because preclusion can attach
to issues adjudicated in nonclass litigation, defendants have every reason
to heavily invest in a single case. And unless the plaintiff’s attorney represents many similarly situated clients, a defendants’ investment incentives may prove overpowering. Aggregate litigation is not cheap: Plaintiffs’ lawyers spend significant resources cultivating both generic and
plaintiff-specific assets. 297 Yet, issue classes that target the defendant’s
conduct can defray generic costs like discovery expenses and encourage
attorneys to invest in small-claims cases. 298
As parties’ investment incentives reach equilibrium, defendants raise
concerns about undue settlement pressure. 299 As a descriptive matter,
295

Conte, supra note 274, § 2:1 (citing jurisdiction over a corporation as a means for costspreading among shareholders in derivative suits as an example).
296
In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2014).
297
Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 13–14 (2007); Joe Nocera,
Forget Fair; It’s Litigation as Usual, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2007, at C1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/business/17nocera.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (estimating that
a single Vioxx case initially costs between $1 million and $1.5 million to develop, but afterwards, others could litigate similar cases for around $200,000).
298
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, 376 F.3d 656, 661
(7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
299
These so-called “blackmail” claims vary substantially in substance, claiming at times
that blackmail occurs because class actions are not triable, are triable, that claims are too
small, that claims are too large, and that size does not matter. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared
to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–61 (2003); see
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certifying a class increases the likelihood of settlement by bringing
claims into the system that individuals have not initiated on their own
and by decreasing the variability in outcomes. Put simply, without a
class, some people would never sue and those who did would reach various conclusions. Nevertheless, empirical researchers at the Federal Judicial Center have disputed whether this pressure is “undue” and found
that “[j]udges spent about eleven times more time on class actions than
on the average civil case.” 300 So, it is unlikely that “the certification decision itself, as opposed to the merits of the underlying claims, coerced
settlements with any frequency.” 301
Issue classes not only bring claims into the system, they terminate the
averaging effect of the “win-some, lose-some” mentality that allows a
consensus about a defendant’s liability to emerge over time. Altering
this laissez-faire paradigm has generated concerns about distributive justice and accuracy. 302 Some have suggested that a single trial is just one
point on a frequency distribution. 303 Trying the same case 100 different
times could yield varied results, thus a claim’s “true” value emerges only by averaging all the awards. 304 From a distributive-justice perspective,
plaintiffs may be over- or under-compensated by a single class-wide trial. But that is true only if the class-wide trial adjudicates individuated
eligibility components. Issue classes that target a defendant’s conduct
would still permit a consensus to emerge as to pecuniary relief.
From an accuracy perspective, a single trial on a defendant’s conduct
might reach the wrong result, which could pressure defendants to settle
prematurely. Perhaps. But consider a few counter-concerns. First, withalso David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 40 (discussing risk aversion to trial and suggesting that “many erroneously claim that defendants are the exclusive or even the systematically likely ‘victims’ of such excessive bargaining leverage”).
300
Thomas E. Willging et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four
Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 61 (1996).
301
Id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 88, at 429–31 (providing a number of reasons to
doubt that class actions actually exert blackmail pressure).
302
See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (“One suit is
an all-or-none affair, with high risk even if the parties supply all the information at their disposal.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (raising accuracy concerns about issue classes); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective
Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1481, 1516 (1992) (decrying the all-or-nothing nature of
a single trial); Stier, supra note 238, at 1018–28.
303
Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815, 834 (1992).
304
Id.
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out issue classes, resource and information asymmetries persist between
the parties. 305 The settlement-pressure pendulum thus swings toward the
plaintiff, 306 who may be forced to settle on the cheap or forgo her claim
entirely. This begs the question of which pressure point is less normatively desirable in light of systemic compensation, deterrence, and procedural legitimacy goals.
Second, issue classes decrease the possibility of inconsistent outcomes and can thereby advance fundamental principles of fairness and
outcome equality. Put plainly, like cases should be treated alike and cases with similar facts should reach similar outcomes. 307 Outcome disparity is no more apparent than when multiple cases reach inconsistent decisions on a defendant’s uniform conduct. 308 Of course, outcome
inequality is expected if the inconsistencies reflect differences in states’
substantive laws. 309 But states differ most over eligibility components. 310
So, certifying conduct components can strike a delicate balance between
achieving uniform outcomes as to a defendant’s actions and allowing inconsistencies based on states’ eligibility components to play out in subsequent cases.
Third, issue classes can enhance accuracy by alleviating undue settlement pressure from frivolous claims. When class actions introduce
meritorious claims into the system, they enhance compensation and deterrence and exert no “undue” pressure. But that changes if weak claims
lurk within the masses. Some generic mechanisms already exist to weed
out frivolous class allegations, such as motions to dismiss for failing to
state a claim, Rule 11 sanctions, summary judgment, and Rule 23(f)

305

See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1865, 1867 (2002) (“Our adversary system is premised upon the idea that the most accurate and acceptable outcomes are produced by a real battle between equally-armed contestants . . . .”).
306
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076–78 (1984) (describing
the effects of resource imbalances on plaintiffs’ settlement incentives).
307
See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 593–
94 (2012) (discussing the importance of outcome equality); Rubenstein, supra note 305, at
1893 (“A common shibboleth of procedural justice is that ‘like cases should be treated
alike.’”).
308
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev.
331, 357; Rubenstein, supra note 305, at 1893–94.
309
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 579
(1996) (noting that when states differ over parties’ rights, “[s]uch differences are what a federal system is all about. They are not a ‘cost’ of the system”).
310
See supra Subsection III.A.2 (discussing choice-of-law concerns).
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class certification appeals. 311 Nevertheless, an issue class on nonindividuated conduct components with separate proceedings on individuated
eligibility components provides a more precise tool to discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from pursuing meritless individual claims.
Although issue classes offer substantial benefits by evening out resource and information disparities, increasing outcome equality, and alleviating undue settlement pressure, they do place considerable stock in
one trial. Juries and judges can err. And the outcome of that trial is not
final in the appellate sense; the trial court (or courts) must still adjudicate any remaining issues. Thus, lingering error can impose substantial
cost on parties and judges. Accordingly, as the Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation suggest, issue classes “must be accompanied by the
opportunity for interlocutory appeal as to any class-wide determination
of the common issue on the merits.” 312 This not only enhances procedural justice and corrects error, 313 but also prevents the added cost of unraveling subsequent verdicts that rely on the integrity of the issue class
judgment.
C. Disaggregating
By their nature, issue classes leave some questions unresolved. The
economic viability and complexity of resolving those remaining questions hinges on three variables: (1) whether the follow-on proceedings
take place in the same court that certified the issue class or in courts dispersed throughout the country; (2) whether the same lawyer (or group of
lawyers) handles subsequent litigation; and (3) whether the remaining
issues require some level of collectivization to maintain their economic
worth.
Some subsequent proceedings will be straightforward. When federal
courts litigate federal questions that would entitle class members to con311
Rule 23(f) allows parties to appeal the certification decision, which principally benefits
defendants. Appellate courts have accepted sixty-nine percent of defendants’ appeals (and
only thirty-one percent of plaintiffs’). Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90
Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 741 (2013). Once accepted, defendants successfully reversed certification seventy percent of the time, but, when plaintiffs appealed, they prevailed only thirty
percent of the time. Id.
312
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. b. The Subcommittee on Rule 23 has indicated a move in this direction. Advisory Committee on Rules
of Civil Procedure, supra note 7, at 39–41.
313
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 35–37 (2009).
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siderable damages, plaintiffs’ attorneys have every incentive to recruit
and represent those claimants in additional proceedings. McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch is a prototypical illustration: Once the district court determined whether Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution policies violated Title VII, “[e]ach class member would have to prove that
his compensation had been adversely affected by the corporate policies,
and by how much,” but because most brokers “earn at least $100,000 a
year,” individual suits were possible. 314 Moreover, those claims would
continue in the same court that certified the issue class, which promotes
consistency and efficiency, and should inform the certifying court’s initial superiority analysis.
Issue classes can also further accuracy, efficiency, and federalism
principles when various lawyers take the helm and litigate subsequent
proceedings in courts throughout the country. Dispersed proceedings are
most likely when (1) a transferee judge certifies an issue in multidistrict
litigation and must remand cases to their transferor courts when classwide proceedings conclude, and (2) states’ attorneys general rely on
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to litigate parens patriae cases in
state courts. Litigating cases before separate juries—regardless of
whether the case remains before the same judge—can raise Seventh
Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns. Accordingly, this Section
considers each issue in turn.
1. Remanding Multidistrict Litigation to Transferor Courts
Remanding multidistrict litigation after resolving common conduct issues on a class-wide basis could make it uneconomical for some plaintiffs to pursue individual claims. But a remand need not prompt a slew
of individual suits. Transferor courts within the same state could coordinate and resolve remanded claims on an aggregated basis under Section
1404(a) and Rule 42. 315 Remand strips away most of the nagging choiceof-law concerns that arise on the national level, which allows transferor
courts to consider state-specific class actions on eligibility components. 316 Moreover, follow-on proceedings could litigate the individuat314

672 F.3d 482, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2012).
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 667, 692 (2013).
316
Even though transferee courts rarely remand cases, when they have done so, they have
cited the need for transferor courts to consider state-specific classes as a reason to remand.
See In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 74–75 (D. Me.
2011); In re Chrysler LLC 2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598
315
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ed personal-injury claims that plaintiffs’ attorneys often relinquish in
hopes of garnering plenary class certification. 317
Conducting subsequent litigation in the transferor courts can alleviate
both procedural and substantive concerns with issue classes. When “local” 318 judges interpret state laws and conduct trials within the affected
community, it satisfies democratic concerns about community involvement in fact finding and should produce greater accuracy, less error, and
increased fidelity to those laws. For example, litigating eligibility components in dispersed courts can correct error by bypassing nonappealable aggregate settlements, building secondary judicial review into the
process, and enabling judges most familiar with a state’s law to interpret
and apply that law. 319 As Judge Easterbrook explained in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., “The central planning model—one case, one court,
one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved—suppresses information that is vital to accurate resolution.” 320 This is principally true
with regard to eligibility components, where states’ laws differ most.
Plus, without the onslaught of nationwide claims, transferor courts can
dismiss cases that fail under specific state provisions.
2. Coordinating the Public and Private Regulatory Response
Because issue classes preclude subsequent cases from relitigating the
same issues, they have the potential to bridge jurisdictional bounda-

F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373–74 (J.P.M.L. 2009). But see Balt. Cnty v. AT&T Corp., 735
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1098–99 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (“In this multi-district litigation, No. 1313, the
court has presided over more than 40 state-wide class actions settlements through final
judgments and administration of the settlements.”).
317
E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 375–76 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Zachery
v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
318
By “local,” I mean federal transferor judges sitting within the state whose laws will
control the dispute’s outcome.
319
E.g., Light Cigarettes, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 77. Remanding to transferor courts builds
some judicial redundancy into adjudication, which can lead to better decisions and correct
erroneous interpretations of state law. See, e.g., Gottschall v. Crane Co., No. A136516, 2014
WL 5025725, at *43–46 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the transferee judge misapplied an eligibility element—the sophisticated user doctrine—and refused to bind the
plaintiff to that erroneous opinion through preclusion). On the benefits of judicial redundancy, see Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 646–57 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the
Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2369, 2373 (2008). For more
information on these points, see Burch, supra note 18.
320
288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
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ries. 321 When state attorneys general initiate parens patriae actions, they
can help overcome the prism effect that makes it difficult for the private
sector to hold defendants accountable. 322 But the cacophony of public
and private litigants pushing different agendas while targeting the same
conduct can lead to discord, inconsistent opinions, wasted litigant and
judicial resources, and unpredictable preclusion.
Take the General Motors ignition switch debacle, for example: Shortly after a massive recall, General Motors was subject to five different
governmental probes and fifty-five class action lawsuits. 323 Two months
later, the number of state investigations alone swelled from one to nine,
all of which proceeded in tandem alongside the other suits. 324 Courts’
ability to formally coordinate these actions is jurisdictionally limited
since state attorneys general often craft their claims to defeat removal to
federal court. 325

321
State and federal courts must afford sister courts full faith and credit. U.S. Const. art.
IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
322
See generally Gilles & Friedman, supra note 2, at 668 (“So state AGs can use parens
patriae to get at many or most of the cases that would otherwise be the subject of class actions, and they can do so unconstrained by class action waivers and, at least for now, the other, lesser challenges that afflict class actions.”).
323
Sarah N. Lynch, GM Says Facing Multiple Probes into Recent Recalls, Reuters
(Apr. 24, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-gm-recall-investigationidUSBREA3N1YU20140424.
324
GM Ignition-Switch Defect Response Probed by 9 States, Automotive News (June
12, 2014), http://europe.autonews.com/article/20140612/OEM11/140619951/gm-ignition-switchdefect-response-probed-by-9-states.
325
See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014);
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668–69 (E.D. La. 2012) (concluding
that the Kentucky attorney general’s action against Merck did not “fall within the ‘slim category’ defined by Grable” and that it merely required the court to interpret FDCA provisions). Some courts addressing pharmaceutical products liability cases have held that federal
question jurisdiction exists under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering
& Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 313–16 (2005), because they present a substantial and disputed federal issue and intricate federal regulatory scheme. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 398378, at *3–5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2008). But see
Kentucky ex rel. Conway v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (W.D. Ky. 2013)
(distinguishing Zyprexa and citing Vioxx as favorable authority because “Kentucky sought
‘civil penalties pursuant to the KCPA and not federally-funded Medicaid reimbursement
payments’” (quoting Vioxx, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 669)); Vermont v. McGrx, Inc., No. 5:10-cv95, 2010 WL 3767794, at *6 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2010) (distinguishing Zyprexa and concluding
that “the State’s claims in the instant case do not involve a similar federal mandate, do not
overlap with the responsibilities of a federal agency, and do not present questions of national
uniformity”).
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But private and public attorneys have historically benefitted from one
another’s efforts through issue preclusion. For instance, in Parklane Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 326 once the Securities and Exchange Commission
successfully proved that Parklane Hosiery issued a materially false and
misleading proxy statement, private litigants did not need to relitigate
that issue. 327 Although the roles are often reversed today—parens patriae claims increasingly follow in the wake of private litigation and sometimes settle alongside private cases in a comprehensive agreement—
preclusion’s role stays consistent. 328
The large number of states that do not require mutuality 329 to assert issue preclusion afford public regulators the luxury of free riding on private counsel’s efforts, which can promote consistency as well as substantive goals. State attorneys general are uniquely positioned to litigate
small claims that are not economically viable standing alone, and can
thus avoid sticky problems with private cy pres awards. 330 While an issue class proves helpful only insofar as states do not require mutual parties, 331 it can reduce inconsistent results across multiple jurisdictions and
remedy, in part, the prism effect described in Part I.
3. Ensuring Adequate Representation and Preclusion
Achieving consistency and efficiency is possible only if issue classes
actually preclude relitigation. While preclusion is relatively straightforward for class members, states’ attorneys general typically are not class
members. Nevertheless, when defendants settle—with state attorneys or
in a class action—they tend to invoke claim preclusion to prevent the
nonsettling parties from relitigating on the theory they were adequately

326

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 332–33.
See Jay L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing,
41 Rutgers L.J. 187, 217 (2009) (“[I]n recent years, the states’ major pharmaceutical-drug
antitrust cases have followed on-going private litigations and were generally settled along
with the private actions.”); Jef Feeley & David Voreacos, Merck to Plead Guilty, Pay $950
Million in U.S. Vioxx Probe, Bloomberg Bus. (Nov. 23, 2011, 9:44 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-22/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-tosettle-u-s-government-s-vioxx-probe (noting that in addition to settling private claims, “[t]he
company agreed in 2008 to pay $58 million to settle claims by 29 states”).
329
See supra note 211 (listing states that do not require mutuality).
330
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.07(b) (discussing
when cy pres awards are appropriate).
331
See supra note 211 (listing states that permit non-mutual offensive issue preclusion).
327
328
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represented in the first suit. 332 Precluding private suits in the wake of a
parens patriae action can be particularly problematic since those suits
have not been subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy requirement and attorneys general may prioritize political agendas and quick resolution over
private claimants’ interests. 333
Deciphering adequate representation in subsequent suits is not an insurmountable hurdle. As I have described elsewhere, 334 these inquiries
should turn on the nature of the rights initially at stake. If the right in the
first suit arises from an aggregate harm—a harm that affects a group of
people equally and collectively—and demands an indivisible remedy,
then courts should tolerate greater conflicts and preclude subsequent individual claims. 335 When the harm and remedy are consistent for all
class members or state citizens, if one group member is inadequately
represented then they all are. Thus inadequate representation occurs only
when lawyers or named representatives act contrary to the group’s best
interests or try to represent an over-inclusive group. 336
For instance, when state actors litigate aggregate harms like water
rights or subway fares, they typically demand indivisible remedies or
statutory penalties that treat affected victims uniformly. 337 The same is
true when a public or private actor litigates a defendant’s conduct components: So long as a defendant’s conduct was uniform, all regulators
have shared incentives to “prosecute” that conduct. Thus, representation
would be inadequate only if the lawyers or the named representatives
acted contrary to the group’s best interests or attempted to represent an
over-inclusive, noncohesive group where a defendant’s conduct toward
the members varied. 338 Consequently, when issue classes or parens patriae suits litigate conduct components or aggregate rights, judges

332
E.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d
440, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that the water authority was precluded by previous
state litigation). Compare Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549,
551–52 (Ga. 2006) (precluding an individual tobacco plaintiff from recovering punitive
damages), with Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 392–93 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011) (permitting an individual tobacco plaintiff to recover punitive damages).
333
Lemos, supra note 63, at 532–36; Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 858–62 (2014); Zimmerman, supra note 63, at 217.
334
Burch, supra note 78, at 3070–77.
335
Id. at 3057–61.
336
Id. at 3051–57.
337
See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (discussing public rights).
338
Burch, supra note 78, at 3061, 3070–77.
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should presume that the regulator adequately represents those collective
rights and tolerate greater intra-group conflicts. 339
Conversely, when state attorneys general pursue private, individual
rights—as they might under their quasi-sovereign interests 340—courts
should not preclude affected individuals from pursuing their own claim
if a structural conflict existed, 341 there was an inequitable allocation of
divisible remedies, the attorney general lacked a sufficient motive to
pursue the case, or the prosecution was completely inept. 342 This allows
attorneys general the latitude to pursue a wide array of harms (including
small claims that might otherwise be under-enforced), but preserves citizens’ individual right to sue if the litigation forecloses their rights without adequate representation.
4. Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause Concerns
For a handful of courts, the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination
Clause can pose one final hurdle to the greater use of issue classes. 343
Closely tied to the right to a jury trial and designed to prevent juries’ decisions from being eviscerated through subsequent legislative or judicial
abuse, 344 the Reexamination Clause states, “[N]o fact tried by a jury,
339

See id. at 3077. This would, of course, cover instances in which the public actor traded
the public interest for timely campaign contributions.
340
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
341
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.07(a). That is, a
conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would represent
claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would present a
significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the
litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.” Id.
342
See id. § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B).
343
See, e.g., Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 509 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303–04 (7th Cir. 1995)) (positing that the bifurcation plan might violate the Seventh Amendment); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the analysis in Rhone-Poulenc); Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1303–04 (arguing that judges cannot “divide issues between separate trials in such a
way that the same issue is reexamined by different juries”). But see Valentino v. CarterWallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that the decision and concerns
in Rhone-Poulenc “may not be fully in line with the law of this circuit”).
344
See Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, at 42 (1990)
(“In three of the New England states—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island—
there was an opportunity for multiple trials. The decision, either real or sham, resulting from
a trial in an inferior tribunal could be appealed to a superior tribunal, where a second and
entirely new trial could be had.”).
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shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.” 345
In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed issue-class certification based, in part, on the fear that subsequent juries
would violate the Reexamination Clause by reconsidering facts relating
to a defendant’s conduct when hearing evidence on the plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief. 346 Breaching a duty, Judge Posner thought, was conceptually intertwined with proximate cause and negligence. 347 Pragmatically, the issue class made little sense: The follow-on cases would have to
rehash much of the same evidence, which meant the class did not materially advance the claims’ resolution. But that pragmatic concern should
not rise to the level of a constitutional one. 348
Shedding light on the distinction between pragmatic and constitutional concerns requires properly construing the word “fact” in the Reexamination Clause itself. Jurors are the fact finders: they sift through the
facts of the case, apply them to a claim’s legal elements, and determine
whether those elements have been satisfied. 349 Reexamining much of the
same evidence in subsequent proceedings bears on whether an issue
class materially advances the litigation, but it does not mean that a second jury will decide the same legal element. 350 Reexamination Clause
violations should occur only if subsequent juries reexamine a legal element determined by the issue class. 351 That might happen, for example,
345

U.S. Const. amend. VII.
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1302–04.
347
Id. at 1303. But see Campos, supra note 88, at 1073.
348
The Seventh Circuit’s more recent cases have implicitly abandoned the Seventh
Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns as the circuit has embraced the greater use of
issue classes. E.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A
determination of liability could be followed by individual hearings to determine the damages
sustained by each class member.”); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012) (certifying an issue class and noting “the next stage
of the litigation, should the class-wide issue be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, will be
hundreds of separate suits for backpay”); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910,
911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If there are genuinely common issues . . . then it makes good sense,
especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the
remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.”).
349
Woolley, supra note 237, at 520–22.
350
Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 169 n.13 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Trying a bifurcated claim before separate juries does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment, but a ‘given [factual] issue may not be tried by different, successive juries.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268 (2d Cir. 1999))).
351
Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1128 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The
prohibition is not against having two juries review the same evidence, but rather against hav346
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if the issue class verdict form is imprecise and muddies which elements
were actually decided so that subsequent juries might be tasked with redetermining the same elements. 352 But that risk can be avoided by using
special verdict forms and instructing subsequent juries as to the first jury’s findings. 353
CONCLUSION
Federalism concerns and jurisdictional restrictions make it challenging for most private and state regulators to capture the full scope of any
national corporate misconduct. This leads to dueling concerns: too few
successful actions in areas typically left to private enforcement like
products liability, consumer protection, and employment discrimination;
and too many competing lawsuits in cases of blatant, high-profile
wrongdoing. Simultaneous concerns about both over- and underenforcement proliferate alongside anxieties about inconsistent judgments, inefficient resource use, and inadequate representation.
Yet, issue classes are well positioned to enhance the enforcement
landscape in two ways. First, they can short-circuit the prism effect that
has hobbled private class actions in recent years. Rethinking class cohesion and certifying core conduct elements when a defendant’s actions
are uniform not only revives class actions by divorcing common components from individuated eligibility components, but also equips both
plaintiffs and defendants with a powerful procedural weapon: two-way
preclusion. It is this two-way preclusion that promises the second benefit. So long as appellate review on the merits exists to correct error and
courts take appropriate steps to ensure adequate representation, litigating
uniform conduct in a single class-wide trial can mute the discord of

ing two juries decide the same essential issues.” (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (D. Del. 1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
352
See, e.g., Blyden, 186 F.3d at 257, 268–69 (noting that both the liability jury and the
damages juries were tasked with deciding which acts constituted “reprisals” after the 1971
riot in Attica prison and that there was a “real possibility” that what constituted a reprisal
would be relitigated by subsequent juries); Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 36
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that “different issues can be submitted to different juries as long
as they are not presented in a way that causes juror confusion or uncertainty”); Steven S.
Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 705, 736–37 (2000) (noting the need to
“carefully define the roles of the two juries” and “carefully craft the verdict form for the first
jury so that the second jury knows what has been decided already”).
353
Woolley, supra note 237, at 542.
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overlapping regulators through preclusion. While subsequent suits may
persist, in the majority of states that have abandoned the mutuality requirement, courts need not relitigate the same conduct-related questions.
Efficient resource use and consistent judgments follow accordingly.

